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AALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PANEL ON
BROWN, ANOTHER COUNCIL OF NICAEA?
Kelly A. MacGrady and John W. Van Doren 1
[The “stupidest housemaid” is speaking and she says, speaking
about herself] “. . . .It scare the stupidest housemaid, but she can look at
the Fourteenth Amendment and read Plessy v. Ferguson and think that
opinion is rightly decided. It seems correct. The rationale makes sense.
Hell, Chief Justice Rehnquist said the same thing when he was a law
clerk. But then to the relief of the stupidest housemaid, the Brown v.
Board of Education opinion makes sense too. It seems right also. So
much for the rule of law. And that scare her too.” 2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Summary of Thesis
1. The AALS Panel on Brown
When considering the product of the AALS Constitutional Law
Panel, entitled “What Brown Should Have Said,” held in January 2000,
in Washington, D.C., we have experienced considerable disorientation. 3
1. Kelly A. MacGrady served as an Associate Editor on the Florida State University Law
Review; J.D. Florida State Unversity College of Law, 2002; Smith College, 1997 B.A. John W.
VanDoren is a Professor at Florida State University College of Law, and a graduate of Harvard College, 1956 A.B., and Yale Law School, 1959. Both wish to thank Florida State College of Law and
Dean Don Weidner for research support. Thanks also to Attorney Sonia Crockett for proof reading
and emotional support.
2. David L. Shapiro, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 1922 (1999) (citations omitted).
3. See Section on Constitutional Law, What Brown Should Have Said, in A Recommitment
to Diversity, Annual Meeting, AALS Program Jan. 5-9, 2000 (2000). The proceedings were published in book form in the summer of 2001, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID, (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2001). We are not concerned with any differences there may be between
the Panelists’ oral opinions at the AALS panel and their written opinions in the book; our concern is
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We therefore ask the question asked by Lucretia in Machievelli’s play,
The Mandragola, “Do you mean it or are you laughing at me?” 4
We fear that the Panelists may be laughing at us. 5 Because, in
short, their writings criticize the formalism that they use in the panel
court opinions. In this article, we pick four of the Panelists, more or less
at random, and confront the question of whether their writings before
and after Brown 6 square with their panel Brown opinions. Those four
are: Professors John Balkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Michael McConnell,
and John Hart Ely. Details of the claims made in this article are confined
to these four Panelists. Strong suspicions, only alluded to in passing
here, have been raised with respect to the other Panelists. 7
After Part I, Summary of Thesis, this article will proceed by discussing a parallel between the AALS Constitutional Law Panel and the
Council of Nicaea in 325 CE that both authorities were dealing with a
social crisis. In Part III, we refer to the dissonance of the Panel’s internal conflicts. In Part IV, we suggest that four Panelists’ formalist opinions in Brown conflict with the jurisprudence of their previous writings.
In Part V, we speculate on how it could occur that these distinguished
Panelists could find themselves in such a contradiction.

only with their oral opinions.
4. In that play, our young protagonist covets a young married woman named Lucretia. She is
married to an older man who is having difficulty procreating an heir. Our protagonist enlists the
help of Lucretia’s confessor, Father Timothy, in a complicated Machiavellian plan. The plotters will
tell her husband that if Lucretia will take the Mandragola potion, and lie with a stranger picked off
the street, her husband will then be able to produce an heir by her. The confessor sides with the plotters and advises her to go ahead with the plan. Father Timothy states that he has been pouring over
the books and the authorities, and that “there are numerous considerations on our side both general
and particular.” Lucretia replies with the above quoted lines: “Do you mean it or are you laughing at
me?” Nicolo Machiavelli, Mandragola, in Eight Great Comedies 60-90 (Barnet, Berman Burto
eds.).
5. Before going to the AALS Panel on Brown, co-author Van Doren was having second
thoughts about research. He was churning out yet another unreconstructed legal realist or even critical legal studies story line, this time on contracts. (For doubts on research enterprises, see John W.
Teeter Jr., The Daishonin’s Path: Applying Nichiren’s Buddhist Principles to American Legal Education, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 271, 276 (1999) (questioning whether we really should be “grinding
out yet another article” when we could be, for example, making ourselves more available to students?)). Id. So in that mood, he was wondering if this was really necessary. After all, are not we
“all realists now”? The panel convinced him that we are not all realists now, so this article was
written.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. There were Derrick Bell, Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Drew S. Days, III and Frank
Michaelman. Professor Patricia Williams was scheduled to attend the panel meeting, but did not.
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2. History of Brown
But first a bit of legal history. The United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination inherent in separate
but equal educational facilities for African Americans and white persons. 8 This case created a terrific controversy and crisis in U.S. society, 9
which had ramifications in U.S. law and jurisprudence circles. The controversy over Brown fueled the fire of the movement to impeach Earl
Warren, 10 the Chief Justice who was instrumental in bringing forth the
unanimous decision. Congress, debating whether to divest the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction in cases involving admission to the bar, loyalty security matters, and other McCarthy era matters got support from Southern segregationists who added their voices to that movement. 11 And later, in Little Rock, President Eisenhower used federal troops to
desegregate the schools there.12 However, Brown, at least today, is accepted across a wide political spectrum. 13 It is accepted as a morally correct decision, though the legal foundation on which it is based is deemed
rather shaky. 14
Brown, created in the teeth of precedent, overruled while purporting
to distinguish a leading precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 and ignored the
state legislatures, which had decreed and reinforced segregation one way
or another. Segregated schools also existed in the District of Columbia,
where Congress had turned a blind eye to such segregation in schools.
These popularly elected bodies were complicitous or passively acquiescent in segregation. Now here comes the elite, appointed, and not popu8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
9. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 247-72 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994)
[hereinafter “CIVIL RIGHTS”] (discussing active and violent resistance to Brown).
10. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 389-92 (Simon & Schuster 1997) [hereinafter “CHIEF”] (desegregation decision fuels impeachment move).
11. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 660 (Alfred A.
Knopf 1994) [hereinafter “HAND”] (Senate considers eliminating Court’s jurisdiction in bar admission, loyalty-security, and other matters). Southern segregationists join in this jurisdiction stripping
bill. Id. at 660.
12. See CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 258-59 (Eisenhower ordered federal troops to Little
Rock); CHIEF, supra note 10, at 343 (Eisenhower had waited and evaded crises by denying they
existed).
13. See, e.g., Audio tape: AALS 2000 Constitutional Meeting: What Brown Should Have
Said (Jan. 5-9, 2000) (Recorded Resources Corp.).
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1334-38 (4th ed. 1975)
(raising numerous questions about the basis of the Brown holding).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Brown overruled a part of Plessy that was essential to it, though actually Brown did not quite overrule Plessy. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
54 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter “FARBER”].
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larly elected United State Supreme Court, declaring that the law stands
against all these august legislatures. 16
The moderator and apparently the originator of the idea for the panel, Professor Balkin, said Brown created a jurisprudential crisis. 17 The
nature of this crisis was not disclosed, but we would venture, Brown was
a case that seemed to be decided correctly morally (after all to openly
defend apartheid is not a lot of fun) but was out of synch with the jurisprudential theories then in vogue. For example, it proved hard to reconcile with the Harvard Legal Process theory, 18 which preached reliance on
the popularly elected officials instead of a strong role for the Supreme
Court. 19 Brown dealt a substantial blow to the Harvard-based Legal
Process School. 20
3. Guidelines of the Panel
The AALS Panel was composed of distinguished academic participants charged with the task of rewriting the Brown opinion, as it should
have been written. The Panel was directed to rethink the premises of
Brown, and in that process the Panelists could consider current theories
of interpretation (whatever those are). And the Panelists could refer to
current ideas about constitutional equality (maybe our ideas about equality have improved, who knows?) with the view in mind of casting Brown
in a more felicitous light. 21
This is at first blush confusing. The Panelists cannot use any cases
or statutes written after 1954, but can consider what we have learned
about interpretation and about equality since then (!). Well, all right,
learning does not stop, and perhaps the note of optimism about “theories
of interpretation” and “knowledge” about equality is the best way to
go. 22 No Panelist obeyed the instructions concerning a current theory of
interpretation and current developments in equality theory. 23 For exam-

16. FARBER, supra note 15, at 55 (Congress could have overruled de jure segregation at the
District of Columbia level).
17. See Professor Balkin, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 59, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 195
(Recorded Resources Corp.).
18. This Process theory was already fairly well established in the 1950’s. See NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 207 (1995) [hereinafter DUXBURY].
19. See infra note 38.
20. The Harvard Legal Process School was unable to come to terms with Warren Court activism but attitudes of that School lived on. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 208.
21. See supra note 13.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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ple, a current theory of interpretation might be postmodernism, but no
one referred to that. 24 Nor did anyone refer, specifically at least, to a
theory of equality that was not present in 1954. The Panelists talked a
lot about equality but it was not related to post-Brown knowledge. 25
4. Summary Critique of the Panel
The law professors instructed to play Supreme Court Justices were
very competent in their enterprise. Constitutional provisions were cited,
including ones that the Court did not refer to, precedents were assembled; even the thrust of the famous social psychology footnote was salvaged and reaffirmed. 26 There were also references to policy arguments
citing in some instances to the briefs that made them. 27
Dissonance arises, however, between previous jurisprudential writings and the Panelists’ mode of delivery, which was formalism or positivism; the Panel’s implicit or explicit affirmation of a formalist methodological orthodoxy stands in stark tension with Panelists’ former
writings. 28 We use the terms formalism and positivism interchangeably
to refer to a rule or standard oriented approach. The basic idea is that
legal decisions are controlled by, and answers found, in preexisting rules
and standards. 29 We use the term methodological orthodoxy to refer to
the idea that legal disputes can indeed be appropriately decided by reference to answers found in an agreed upon set of materials, usually written, which contain those answers. In Christian theological disputes this
methodological orthodoxy would be illustrated where reference by officials would be to the Scripture and clerical comment on the Scripture. In
other words, the Panelists affirmed the basic premise that the canon,
with the help of reason, resolves the controversy. 30 Canon, here, we
would define, as a reference to what sources is appropriate for the reso24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954). This footnote, number 11,
cited psychologists to the effect that state imposed segregation led to a feeling of inferiority of
Blacks, which retards their ability to learn. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. For reaffirmation of this
footnote, see Professor Ely, Address at the 2000 AALS Annual Constitutional Meeting (Jan. 5-9,
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196
(Recorded Resources Corp.) and infra Ely section III D.
27. See Professor Bell, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 5-9,
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196
(Recorded Resources Corp.).
28. See infra section III.
29. See, e.g., John W. Van Doren, An Attack on a Defense of Modern Positivism, 25 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 813, 815 (1991).
30. For examples of the canon referred to, see infra section III.
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lution of legal disputes.
That Brown could be resolved so easily is inconsistent with the
strong reactions inspired by Brown from the participants in the Harvard
Law School Holmes Lectures. Lecturers in that series were preoccupied
with Brown, and the Warren Court, which produced it. Professor Herbert Wechsler, 31 Judge Learned Hand, 32 and Professor Alexander Bickel, 33 struggled mightily, but even these luminaries were unable to prevent the downward drift of the Legal Process School. 34 Herbert
Wechsler attacked Brown, arguing that the Court decided the case without reference to neutral principles. 35 Learned Hand criticized Brown also
on a similar basis, and suggested that judicial review should, with some
exceptions, be at an end. 36 Finally, Professor Alexander Bickel found
that in some cases, such as racial segregation cases, there is tension between principle and expediency, and therefore the only appropriate
choice for the Court was to practice prudence and refrain from judicial
review. 37 In sum, as illustrated by the above lecturers, the prevailing jurisprudence of the Brown era was based on positivism or formalism,
with its attendant stare decisis prop, and a faith in reasoned elaboration
premised explicitly or implicitly on an assertion of the primacy of elected bodies over a non-elected court. 38
The drift of the AALS Panel, with very few exceptions, was that resort to the canon and legal analogical reasoning, formalism and legal
positivism were up to the task of justifying legal decisions, presumably
of any type or nature. 39 It was a surprise to see most of the participants
adopt the formalist mode, e.g., Professor Catharine MacKinnon, Professor Derrick Bell, even Professors Bruce Ackerman and Frank Michaelman. Professor Bell, who distanced himself from positivism the most, at

31. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15, 34 (1959) [hereinafter “WECHSLER”].
32. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Harvard Univ. Press 1958).
33. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 283 (Bickel lectured in 1969).
34. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 282 (erosion began with Warren Court).
35. See WECHSLER, supra note 31. Such neutral principles transcend the immediate result
and therefore are not just fashioned to obtain a particular result. See id. at 15 (neutral principles
stand in contrast to ad hoc use of principle to achieve a particular result).
36. See HAND, supra note 11, at 652-72.
37. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 279 (1995) (there is no neat dividing line between principle and expediency therefore where there is this conflict potential, courts (as in Brown), should
refrain from acting). Id. at 279-80.
38. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 288 (Bickel referred to this problem as one of the counter-majoritarianism: unconstitutional ruling reverses policy of elected representatives). Stare decisis
is a legal concept that past decisions should be honored and determine the results in future cases.
39. Cf. supra note 13.
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one point, invoked “the Constitution” as an important standard supporting his argument. 40
In attempting to come to terms with the significance of the Panel,
we look to parallels in the realm of theological controversy. One of us
has pursued such broad parallels before,41 and Professor Balkin and other commentators have followed this course in other legal contexts.42 To
pursue this analogy, we look to the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, where
bishops assembled to determine orthodoxy in religious doctrine. For at
Nicaea, there was an endorsement of a legitimacy of a methodological
orthodoxy. The methodological orthodoxy arose from the use of Scripture, and the integration of material from bishops and other clerical
commentators. 43
In other words, the Panel used traditional sources, e.g., the Constitution and cases, and thereby endorsed them in the form of a rule of
recognition, to use the term of H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism. The rule
of recognition is a rule derived from observation of what sources decision makers refer to in resolving controversies. 44 The methodological
orthodoxy centered on a universal emphasis on the Constitution, cases
construing it, and other formal sources selectively chosen including State
and Supreme Court cases, and by surprise, even the Declaration of Independence. 45 Just as at Nicaea, we can see the secular bishops of our day,
perhaps striving consciously or unconsciously, for a validation of appropriate sources or a canon for the determination of controversy. The politics of legitimation, status, prestige and power are at stake now as in 325
CE. Also in tandem with Nicaea, the Brown panelists reached a consensus on the result. 46
But there are other stories that come out of this exercise by the panel of secular bishops. One is disarray and contradiction arising out of the
cacophony of panel opinions, proceeding from the canon, leading the
40. See Bell, supra note 27.
41. See John W. Van Doren, Contradiction and Legitimacy in Christianity and United States
Constitutionalism, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 637 (1989).
42. See Balkin, infra section III A.
43. See LEO DONALD DAVIS, S.J., THE FIRST SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 69-77 (1987)
(gospels and apostolic writing used at Nicaea as a basis for dogma which evolved) [hereinafter
“COUNCILS”].
44. See John W. Van Doren, An Attack on a Defense of Modern Positivism, 25 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 813, 815 (1991) (discussing Hart’s Rule of Recognition). The comparison could be made of
cases to clerical commentary and apostolic writings, though for our purpose it is more important to
find some rule of recognition of appropriate sources, rather than worry about exact parallels between cases and clerical commentary.
45. See discussion of panelists infra section II.
46. See supra note 13.
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panel toward self-destruction. 47 Since there are no records of the meeting
at Nicaea, the bishops were spared this exercise in contradiction.48 Secondly, as mentioned above, there is substantial conflict between the formalism or positivism implicit in the opinions and the previous written
positions of the panelists we discuss, which refute and question severely
the positivist frame. 49 We now proceed to our parallel with the Council
of Nicaea.
II. PARALLEL TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA
A. History of the Council
In 325 CE, the Council of Nicaea, summoned by the Emperor Constantine I, met in Nicaea to deal with a crisis in another community, this
time, overtly at least, traceable to religious controversy over the nature
of the Godhead. 50 What is the relationship between God and Jesus? Was
there a time when Jesus did not exist? Was Jesus of a different substance than God or the same substance? Relatedly, was Jesus subordinate to God? And where does the Emperor fit in? Is he bound by law
set by the Church, or is he the source of all law so that his law would
prevail over contrary Church law? It was this latter controversy that
contributed to the later repudiation of the homoousios doctrine, which
stated that God and Jesus were of the same substance, because it limited
the power and authority of the Emperor. 51 This dispute, stirred up in the
Scriptural context, was settled by reference to an extra-Scriptural source,
the Greek language idea of homoousios. There was resistance to this
term for several reasons. Some eastern bishops did not like the uncertainty that homoousios might generate. Conservatives did not like importing terms from outside the sacred text.52 This controversy prefigures
the originalist vs. non-interpretivist debates in jurisprudence. At Nicaea,
the Council found God and Jesus were of one substance, so that it was
then possible to identify as heresies the claim that Jesus was subordinate
to God, and the Arian claim that there was a time when Jesus did not exist. Since God and Jesus were of the same substance, there was no time
when Jesus “was not.” But the decision did not come without extreme
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See IB, infra.
COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 59 (official minutes did not survive, if they were taken).
See infra section III.
See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 51-56.
See id., supra note 43, at 74-77.
Id. at 62.
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controversy. 53
The final resolution at Nicaea, based on homoousios, had sufficient
ambiguity to gain assent, but at the same time involved a contradiction,
which later accommodated substantial controversy. 54 There are broad
significant parallels between the Council of Nicaea and the AALS Panel.
Both sought to be ecumenical, that is, sought to have the appearance of
representing diverse regional and political components. The Council
meeting at Nicaea had delegate bishops from the western and eastern
sections of the Church.
In the AALS Panel on Brown, we encountered the ruling “secular
bishops” of this day, the law professors, largely from the Harvard, Yale,
Columbia axis, yet another Trinity. For there they were, addressing a
leading controversy of our lifetime, apartheid in America, spinning out
their legal scripture from the Constitution and its commentators and legalists in cases. They had the same problems as the bishops at Nicaea.
To what extent can an ancient text bear the crucial job of exegesis to
solve problems of the day which find their way into the legal sphere?
And to what extent must the secular bishops (law professors and Supreme Court Justices) give way to forces outside the text, such as policy,
morals, and politics to resolve those crises?
53. See generally, supporting this paragraph, id. at 33-80. “The word homoousios had a long
history. . .even though accepted in the creed, it was objectionable to the majority of the bishops for
at least four reasons. First, the term, despite Constantine’s statement, had strong materialist overtones which would connote that Father and Son are parts or separable portions of the same “stuff”.
Secondly, if Father and Son were of one numerically identical substance, then the doctrine of the
creed could well be Sabellian, Father and Son being identical and indistinguishable. Thirdly, the
term was associated with heresies since it had been coined by the Gnostics and had, in fact, been
condemned at the Council of Antioch in 268 as used by the Adoptionist Paul of Samosata. Fourthly
and importantly for many of the more conservative bishops, the term was not scriptural.
Despite the misgivings of perhaps the majority of the attending bishops the term was added to the creed. It seems clear that the authority of Constantine was the main motivating force. Yet
behind Constantine was his long-time chief ecclesiastical advisor, Ossius of Cordoba, a bishop immersed in the theology of the western church. Though the Latin equivalent of homoousios, consubstantial, was not yet a fully accepted term in the western theological vocabulary, it was suited to
describe the type of Trinitarian theology fashionable in the West with its strong insistence on the
divine monarchy. It is likely that in pre-consiliar discussions Ossius had gained the support of Alexander of Alexandria and cooperation of Constantine to urge the term on the assembled bishops.
The very ambiguity of the word would possibly have appealed to the politician Constantine was.
Within limits the bishops could read their own meaning into the term which still had the merit of
scotching the Arian view. So homoousios, coined by Gnostic heretics, proposed by an unbaptized
emperor, jeopardized by naïve defenders, but eventually vindicated by the orthodox, was added to
the Creed of Nicaea to become a sign of contradiction for the next half-century.”Id. at 61-62.
54. See id. at 94-100 (Nicene Creed with homoousios repudiated in a later council; Nicene
Creed seems to go down to defeat). See also HENRY CHADWICK, THE EARLY CHURCH 130-31
(Dorset Press ed., Penguin Books Ltd. 1986) (crucial terms of the Nicene Creed did not mean the
same thing to all the Bishops because of the ambiguity of homoousios).
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Whether it is appropriate to use policy as a determinant of legal
cases today is controversial. The modern legal positivists indicate that
policy may play a limited role. 55 But the positivist stress rules with a
core of certainty and a presumably small penumbra of doubt. These
rules do not require a fresh judgment from case to case. 56 The positivists
could probably fit Brown into the “open-textured” area, where policy
could bring resolution. 57 This view contrasts with that of Dworkin who
argues that in hard cases political morality must be invoked, and there
are preexisting rights determinable from preexisting legal principles.58
Dworkin deprecates the use of policies, finding reliance on it by courts
to be wrong. 59 Others, such as adherents to Professor Myres MacDougal’s Policy Science would use policies that they consider determinant in
deciding cases. 60 Many jurists are reluctant to include policy in the
equation because that smacks too much of politics and affirms legal realism and relativity. Whether there is a clear distinction between law and
policy, or law and politics, and if not, if this can be acknowledged openly in 2002, is an open question.
There were some tensions on this even in 325 CE. The bishops
disputed the inclusion of the homoousios doctrine because, in part, it was
not in the text. The parallel between Nicaea and the Panel can be exemplified in another comparison. Professor McConnell is basically an
originalist in orientation, and Professor Ely also has originalist leanings.
By “originalism” we mean a tendency to stress the original text of the
Constitution as it was understood at the time of enactment. Originalists
are wary of the Supreme Court and wish to restrict the scope of the
court, at least on a substantive basis. Perforce, Professors MacKinnon
and Balkin are not originalists. In any event, the parallel is with the use
of the term homoousios, which the Scriptural originalists opposed be-

55. See Peter Mirfield, In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism, 16 FLA. ST .U.L. REV. 985,
989 (1989) (raising the question as to whether Hart’s system does or can be made to include “principles,” and whether in open textured cases courts engage in a rule producing function). See also
H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream
11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter “Eyes”].
56. See Mirfield, supra note 55, at 989; See also Eyes, supra note 55.
57. See Eyes, supra note 55, at 978-987 (alluding to the “open textured” area with a criticism
of Dworkin for arguing that there are right answers in that “hard case” area).
58. See generally Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165
(1982). See also DUXBURY, supra note 18 at 293-94 (Dworkin decries use of policy, favoring the
discovery of rights based on principle).
59. Eyes, supra note 55, at 982-83 (criticizing Dworkin’s emphasis on policy, which Dworkin
finds to be a legislative not a judicial concern).
60. See generally W. REISMAN AND A. SCHREIBER, UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW:
CASES, READINGS, COMMENTARY (1987).
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cause it was not in the Scriptural text. That the homoousios or “same
substance” doctrine was not in the Scriptures was used as an important
argument to reject it and the Nicene Creed at a later council.61 At Nicaea, Constantine had to use suasion and exile to obtain unity. 62 If there
is discord, instability, and dissent, one way to achieve unity is to expel
the dissenters.
There may be a parallel between the use of political power and
court decisions and political power and the Council of Nicaea. Constantine coerced reluctant bishops presumably to obtain a unity that was important to his empire-building. Professor Bell points out that the government brief written to overturn Plessy, stated that apartheid was an
albatross on a post World War II United States, emerging as a major
World Power. For the new American Empire needed to influence the
hearts and minds of the Third World, most of who were not white. Is
this a gentle nudge from the Constantine of our time, to go ahead with
Brown desegregation? 63
B. The AALS Secular Bishops
In the AALS Panel, the secular bishops dealing with Brown came
forth with all manner of secular doctrine: equal protection, privileges
and immunities, the Citizenship Clause, the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, incorporation
of this in that, and that in this. 64 The artillery was wheeled out and put in
place. Some members of the Panel, however, then displayed conflict
about the appropriate canon for resolution. Similarly, the bishops at Nicaea dealt with a swelter of possible interpretations of Scripture in the
first three centuries. 65 Could an audience member listening to the Panel
not wonder if by chance she had gone to the wrong hotel and gotten into
a conference of bickering prelates trying to declare unity and resolve a
societal crisis? 66
It may be objected that the Panelists did not specifically adopt any
“methodological orthodoxy,” as we suggest in section IA4, infra. Put
another way, what other choice did the Panelists have when they accept61. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 97-100 (Nicene Creed seems to be defeated).
62. See id. at 63 (bishops exiled who failed to sign).
63. See supra note 13.
64. See id.
65. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 33-58.
66. The political pressure of Constantine, which resulted in the Nicene Creed, is an important
lesson in how truth is established. Those not accepting the Nicene Creed were threatened with exile
or actually exiled. See id. at 63.
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ed Professor Balkin’s invitation to sit as a Supreme Court on Brown? 67
We say that by the act of participation, the Panelists at least implicitly
affirmed the methodological orthodoxy of the canon as the source of
resolution. The Panelists could have refused to participate. There must
be some panel to which they or we would not lend our presence as panelists with the concomitant legitimation that may result. What about a
panel in praise of Nazism, did the holocaust really occur, what Dred
Scott, Korematsu, or Bradwell v. Illinois, should have said, antiSemitism, “the final solution,” or advocacy of physical abuse of children
or women so as not to spare the rod, or incest 2002, take your pick.
The values asserted by the Panel were those of formalism of the
H.L.A. Hart variety, reinforcing the value of the canon and methodological orthodoxy in its use. Moreover, the value of reason as a determinant
was reinforced: better reason produces better results (What Brown
Should Have Said). This position stands in contradiction to the previous
writings of the representative scholars we discuss with respect to legal
methodology or jurisprudence, 68 and leaves one proclaiming with Lucretia, are you serious, or are you laughing at me?
C. The Panel’s Internal Conflicts
The value of methodological orthodoxy affirmed by the Panel was
undermined by the tendency of the Panel to self-destruct. While there
was reference to the canon for resolution, the composition of the relevant
canon and choices of doctrine from it were highly controversial. For example, Balkin found an equality principal in the Declaration of Independence. 69 Michaelman thought there might be an equality principle
there, but indicated that harvesting such a principle could only be done
with a moral decision. 70 Michaelman noted that such an equality provision was ignored for 75 years. 71
There was also disarray concerning which clause of the Fourteenth
67. Conversation with Professor Tahirih Lee, Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (on or about February 12, 2001).
68. Professor McConnell may provide an exception. His panel presentation is consistent with
his previous writings. However in expanding the canon to include Congressional votes on issues
related to the Fourteenth Amendment, and by choosing to derive the meaning of the Constitution
from Congressional votes, he appears to engage in the shell game, result oriented tactic for which he
condemns others. See McConnell section, infra IIIC.
69. See Balkin, supra note 17.
70. See Professor Michaelman, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting
(Jan. 5-9, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said,
Tape 195 (Recorded Resources Corp.).
71. See id.
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Amendment should govern. Should it be the Citizenship Clause, 72 or the
Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or the
clause empowering Congress to implement the Amendment, or more
than one of those clauses? 73 McConnell and Ely argued that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection applied only to the states. 74 Ely
denied that the Fifth Amendment incorporated the Fourteenth, and Sunstein held the same, but found the Fifth Amendment applied to reach the
Federal control of the District of Columbia. Sunstein relied on the Fifth
Amendment without reference to any incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This created dissonance with the Brown Court’s holding
that the Fifth Amendment incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ackerman found the Citizenship Clause could be used to find and
enforce rights of national citizenship. Not to be outdone, Days agreed
that the Amendments were not quite congruent (the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment) but he supported
an equality principle in the Citizenship Clause, which meant talent and
achievement were the only aristocracy. 75 This equality principle served
to affirm the Brown result and the Bolling v. Sharpe extension to federal
action. Balkin also argued that the Citizenship Clause applies to delimit
the Federal Government from segregation of the races. The reasoning
here was similar to the above arguments that making persons citizens
creates rights of national citizenship, including a right to education for
all citizens. Sunstein dismissed such considerations because they were
not argued or briefed. 76 The appropriate remedy in the Brown Panel
was controversial, all the way from one with extreme teeth (Bell) to
“immediate compliance.”
Dispute continued with disagreement over whether the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment could be known. Days had no trouble finding
that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment meant that schools could
not be segregated. MacKinnon found the intent from an equality princi72. See id.
73. See Michaelman, supra note 70.
74. See id. Michaelman states that the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the states
only. See id.
75. For these statements, see supra note 13.
76. See id. Michaelman was not as sure, but may be arguing that the federal government could
make the people citizens of both the state and federal government. But Michaelman notes two problems: the Citizenship Clause does not apply directly against the states, and if the Citizenship Clause
gave the recipients the rights of white citizens, what were those rights? On balance, it was doubtful
to him that the Citizenship Clause could yield a national right to education. Ackerman and Days
differed with some of their colleagues on whether the Court has a duty to override legislatures in
appropriate cases. Ackerman and Days thought yes, while Ely and McConnell stressed deference.
See id.
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ple, which she obtained, perhaps, from Aristotle. She seemed critical,
however, of the way the principle had worked out. She was also critical
of the interpretation of the equality principle in Aristotle’s time, a time
in which the equality principle was found consistent with prostitution
and slavery. Balkin found the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment
uncertain. McConnell found the debates surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment inconclusive, but fleshed out the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment from Congressional votes on related issues close to the time
of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 77
Moreover, those Panelists who used cases to firm up the intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment had some disagreement on what those cases
were. Some thought older state cases unhelpful, while others found
them helpful. When it came to United States Supreme Court cases, it
was difficult to keep up with the variety, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, Burnette, Korematsu, and a host of others. 78 The kind of unity we might
have hoped for from the Panel was belied by disagreement over what
cases were relevant. There was also conflict over the importance of the
feelings of Blacks about inferiority deriving from segregation. Ely
thought this was important, regardless of the conflict that existed in the
literature or which occurred at the time over the sociological footnote.79
Law that engendered these inferiority feelings seemed crucial to
MacKinnon, 80 but to Days this was not relevant. 81
As mentioned before, another sticky point would have been, had the
issue been raised, whether policy was relevant, and once we find ourselves in the policy arena, what policies are relevant? The observer must
remain puzzled over the difference if any between “law” and policy. Is
the question of whether “separate but equal” is inherently unequal a policy question or an issue of positive law or both? Seemingly, it is a policy question. This Panel, for its part, displayed varying approaches to
whether policy was relevant, and if so, what policies. Sunstein studiously avoided any reference to policy, while Bell argues almost solely on
the basis of policy. 82
We may wonder what the formalist panel would say about Bell’s
very policy-oriented approach. Would Sunstein, for example, agree with
Bell that the United States was embarrassed in world affairs with its
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. for these statements.
See id.
See Ely, infra III D.
See MacKinnon, infra III B.
See supra note 13.
See id.
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apartheid policy and that this is an important consideration in the case? 83
Bell relies on the Justice Department’s brief, which made this point; 84
the question is thus raised of whether this sort of political or policy argument is properly made in court. Would Sunstein or the other Panelists
agree with Bell’s argument in his opinion, that there was a tacit agreement between the lower socio-economic classes and the ruling powers:
you allow the elite managerial and owning class to maintain wage slavery (Bell’s term), and we will agree to preserve your position relative to
the subordinate position of African Americans? 85 Would they rule such
an argument “out of bounds” improperly raised in a Supreme Court
opinion?
Thus, the move to policy showed the Panel’s disarray further. Professors Ackerman, Balkin, and Michaelman relied on the “unthinkable”
rationale of Brown, but Ely, who found the “unthinkable” argument
gives too much power to the courts, opposed them. 86 The “unthinkable”
argument used by the Brown court was that it would be unthinkable if
the federal government in the District of Columbia could do what the
state governments were forbidden to do, namely segregate the races in
education. Ely argued that some theory should be found to hold the federal government to the Brown standard. He just thought that the “unthinkable argument” went too far, and criticized Michaelman for using
that argument. However, Ely did find that the federal government is
bound, but was conclusionary and uninformative as to why. 87
The extent to which the canon could bear the interpretive task, and
its composition were controversial. Some thought the Constitution
could bear the burden of this decision, but others doubted this. Michaelman thought the Constitution might not be able to bear the burden,
but let us get as much out of it as we can. 88 Even jurisdiction was controversial. McConnell thought, at least concerning the desegregation decision in the District of Columbia, Congress intended to reserve jurisdiction to itself to the exclusion of the Court.
In sum, similar to Nicaea, the Panel exhibited disarray in determining the canon and considerable dispute as to what was appropriately derivable from it. The use of methodological orthodoxy to resolve contro-

83. See Bell, supra note 27.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Ely section, infra III D. Ely thought that Michaelman came “dangerously close” to
buying the “unthinkable” argument. See Ely, supra note 26.
88. See id.
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versy was thus seriously undermined.
III. THE VIEWS OF THE PANELISTS
Not only is the methodological orthodoxy as a determinant of the
result in Brown undermined by Panel conflict, but there is further dissonance because the Panel’s opinions on Brown do not square with most of
the writings of the Panelists we selected for study. The formalism involving the implicit claim that the canon produces the Brown result is at
odds with our selected Panelists’ jurisprudence as revealed in their
prepanel writings. In what follows, we consider the contrast between the
four representative Panelists and their writings.
A. Professor John Balkin
As we see it, Balkin’s basic problem is that his Panel opinion is
very formalistic, or as he might say, syncretic (pointing to one truth), but
his previous writings display a “diachronic,” or to use his words, “multiple perspective postmodern” stance. Professor John Balkin was the
moderator and apparently the originator of the Constitutional Law Panel,
“How Brown Should Have Been Decided.”
1. What He Wrote Before
Balkin has concerned himself with Brown frequently in elaborating
his theories and responding to others. 89 Balkin appears, at other times,
in the discussion circles of postmodernism. Those who espouse postmodernism often indicate that the concept resists description. Balkin describes it as a perception that the times in which we live are sufficiently
unique so that different interpretations of the Constitution may be required. 90
The idea that changing times may require different Constitutional
directions will meet with opposition from the traditionally conservative
originalists and others, who maintain that interpretation must be limited
to the intent of the Framers and Ratifiers, and must relate to conditions
and mindsets at the time of making. This could be described as a tradition snapshot theory. Take a picture of tradition at the relevant time, and
89. See, e.g, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 n.2 (1997) [hereinafter
“Status”]; J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
963, 999 (1998) [hereinafter “Canon”]; Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History
(book review), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 944 (1988) [hereinafter “History”]; What is Postmodern
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1977 (1992) [hereinafter “Constitutionalism”].
90. See Constitutionalism, supra note 89, at 1977.
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that is the tradition adopted. So it is not surprising that, in accordance
with his postmodernist perspective, Balkin has also zealously denounced
originalism. Balkin’s criticism of originalism is that there can be no one
intent to follow because the Ratifiers’ intentions were mixed, in that the
Constitution was a compromise of divergent interests and intentions, 91
and accompanying moral and political viewpoints. Furthermore, Balkin
points out that there was no one group of Framers, since the Constitution
has been amended, such as in 1868, 92 with, importantly here, the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is extremely difficult to reconcile Balkin’s postmodernism with
the formalism of his panel presentation. Consistent with his postmodern
direction, Balkin has concluded that the Constitution is capable of multiple interpretations and thus inherently iterable, that is, it can be read in
different ways, depending on who the reader is. 93 Balkin’s written views
on the Constitutional tradition smack of Legal Realism, which encourages us to look at law as manipulable by interpretive theory or attuned to
conflicting policies rather than rules. Balkin writes: “[Our] theories of
the Constitution are makeshift attempts, reflecting the concerns of our
era, but dressed up as timeless claims about interpretation.” 94 Curiously,
(since he comes from a different political camp), Professor McConnell
makes a similar point. 95
According to Balkin, originalism and formalism (positivism) are
further untenable because the constitutional canon is not just contained
in the Constitutional document itself and Supreme Court opinions, but
within sociological developments, such as skills, approaches, standard
examples, forms of argument, and even stock stories. 96 Balkin’s expansive view, compatible with Legal Realism, if not its incarnation, is that
public opinion more often than not leads the Supreme Court so that
judges then “discover” new rights in the Constitution. 97
The legal system must then, according to Balkin, by its very nature,

91. See History, supra note 89, at 924, where Balkin criticizes originalist Raoul Berger for not
taking into consideration that the ratifiers had divergent interests with regard to federal and state
power.
92. See id. at 942, 949 (legal system diachronic).
93. Id. at 933.
94. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1703, 1719 (1997) [hereinafter “Agreements”].
95. See Professor McConnel, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan.
5-9, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape
195 (Recorded Resources Corp.), and McConnell, section III C, infra.
96. See generally, Canon, supra note 89.
97. Id. at 1022-23 (public opinion leads the Court, at times).
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be viewed from a diachronic perspective. 98 A “diachronic perspective”
stands for the proposition that the meaning of the Constitution is required to change over time, as legislation is created and then interpreted
by courts. The canon is used as a vehicle “for the normalization of beliefs and interpretive assumptions, and hence as instruments for social
control by the relevant interpretive community.” 99 The correct interpretive process, or arriving at proper law, is not easy, however, because the
Supreme Court, warns Balkin, has done “‘wicked things” purporting to
follow the Constitution, such as promulgate racism and sexism. 100
The wickedness, however, about which Balkin cautions his readers
does not stop at the Supreme Court interpretations in that the Constitutional document is indictable also. 101 There may be limits to the use of
the Constitution to find appropriate law, because the Constitution itself
may be deeply flawed. Thus, Balkin questions whether the Constitution
itself may be “evil.” 102 What Balkin means by “evil” is that the Constitution contains written clauses, which provide for things that in today’s
society are strictly taboo, for one, slavery. 103 In short, the original Constitution and its ratifiers supported the institution of slavery, as well as
such “evils” as sexism. The slave trade was, in fact, so important to the
ratifiers that it could not be constitutionally abolished until 1808. Balkin
still queries if William Lloyd Garrison might not be correct in maintaining that the Constitution is “a covenant with death, and an agreement
with hell.” 104
98. History, supra note 89, at 930-33; Balkin contrasts the diachronic perspective with the
conservatives’ synchronic perspective, which asserts that there is one rule of law and that rule was
created by the Framers. Balkin’s opinion is that the synchronic and diachronic perspectives are not
only in tension, but must go hand in hand; stare decisis flows from the simultaneous creation of new
law. See id. This is puzzling, however, and appears to involve a departure from the general understanding of the words stare decisis. Stare decisis must be conceived as highly flexible and “diachronic” itself.
99. Canon, supra note 89, at 1019.
100. Id. at 1017.
101. Id. at 1024.
102. Id. at 1023. “What shall we do if we discover that the Constitution itself might be an evil
document that keeps evil in place. . . .” Id.; See also, Agreements, supra note 94, at 1704. “[T]he
Constitution exists in a political system that is certainly not completely just and may in fact be very
unjust . . . . the Constitution we are faithful to might be an evil Constitution. . . .” Id.
103. See Agreements, supra note 94, at 1707-08. One of the two unamendable provisions according to Article V is that slave trade could not be abolished before 1808. Id. There is also the
Fugitive Slave Clause. Id. at 1708.
104. Id. Balkin also states that the Constitutional tradition causes social and psychological
pressures of “fidelity” which have three adverse effects: we tend to see the Constitution for whatever we see fit; we conform our ideas of justice to our sense of what the Constitution means; and, the
practice of constitutional interpretation skews and limits our understanding of justice because not all
claims are equally easy to state in the language of that tradition. Id. at 1704.
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Balkin’s painting of the Constitutional picture does not get significantly prettier, or less “evil.” He further alerts his readers that “[w]e
cannot avoid having constitutional doctrines simply because they may
turn out to be inadequate or imperfect. But we can avoid believing that
the truth about society is described within them.” 105 Balkin gave as an
example, the Fourteenth Amendment: 106 it may conflict with the view of
Lincoln himself, who once said that if he could have preserved the Union with slavery, he would have. 107 The truth about society, which this
example reveals, is that even though the Fourteenth Amendment may
have been written in order to abolish slavery and create [formal] equality
for Blacks, the reality is that even the President of the United States did
not agree with it. The Fourteenth Amendment, like the original Constitutional document, was a compromise.
Further difficulties arise for originalists who favor the result in
Brown. The Ratifiers, not only of the original Constitution, but also of
the reconstruction amendments, supported slavery or subordination of
Blacks. Thus an originalist favoring Brown cannot realistically (or morally) be strict because he/she would have to go back and reverse Brown
in that desegregation does not align with original intent. 108
Balkin has not given up, though. He has to expand the canon to
keep going. He has maintained that the underlying truth about our Constitutional government is not actually to be found in the Constitution of
1787, but rather in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. According
to Balkin, the Declaration of Independence, rejected social hierarchy and
embraced social equality. 109 A small problem arises however when Balkin admits that in 1776 social equality did not include women, slaves,
and white men without property. 110
Unimpeded, Balkin heads for the stratosphere, and states that his
conception of democracy is simply a form of social organization, which
has not yet been fully realized. 111 The American Revolution was about
an “egalitarian urge” which was then “enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence and forms the underlying spirit of our constitutional tradi105. Status, supra note 89, at 2374.
106. Ratified as one of the reconstruction amendments following the Civil War.
107. Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4-SPG Widener L. Symp. J. 167,
168 (1999) [hereinafter “Declaration”] (citing Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley
(Aug. 22, 1862), reprinted in THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 234 (Andrew Delbanco ed.,
1992)).
108. See History, supra note 89, at 944.
109. Declaration, supra note 107, at 171-72.
110. Id at 172.
111. Status, supra note 89, at 2314-15.
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tion.” 112 Therefore, according to Balkin, the Constitution must not be
read by its individual clauses, but as a “respons[e] to social movements
demanding changes in social structure.” 113
Balkin persists. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause
is understood to reflect an overarching democratic goal of eliminating
social hierarchy. 114 In effect, Balkin is able to cite it in support of his
thesis that we should strive for “Ideal Constitutionalism.” That is, “we
must try to see the true and good things in it.” 115 From that, presumably,
comes good constitutional law.
Balkin’s ideas of an underlying democratic plan and Ideal Constitutionalism may perhaps appear to flow nicely into his postmodernist perspective. He finds that there is a choice and we must look at constitutional law in light of the realities of society today. But Balkin actually
creates a sticky Cartesian Circle, which might otherwise be referred to as
a loop, for himself. He has stated that certain constitutional cases have
been wrongly interpreted. 116 Here we have to pause and ask ourselves,
when someone says, “this case is wrong,” what standards are they using?
Balkin may be telling us that the original Constitutional document or,
constitutional tradition does contain a specific answer and judges in the
past got it wrong. Or, it may be that all this hype about a diachronic perspective and appreciating history is just hype; it’s really synchronic. Finally, he may be telling us that his views are “true and good” while others are “wicked” or “evil.”
Though Balkin is admittedly left-liberal, 117 he does not seem to
have any trouble using the traditionally conservative order of morality;
i.e., there is fundamentally a “good” versus “evil.” Balkin has specifically compared differences in legal reasoning to religion. 118 The religion

112. Id. at 2316.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2347.
115. Agreements, supra note 94, at 1709.
116. See, e.g. id., where Balkin states that Dred Scott (holding that Blacks are not citizens)
was decided wrongly.
117. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (1995) (book review), “. . .I want to focus primarily on the discourse of leftliberals, because it is the ideological community in which both Sunstein and I (and a great many
other legal academics) are located.” Id.
118. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious about “Taking Legal Reasoning Seriously,” 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543, 556 (1999). Balkin discusses lawyer- economists and doctrinalists with an analogy to religious groups. Id. at 556-58. Syncretic religions, like the lawyer- economists, accept alien influences. The syncretic religions think they are correct because they embrace
the other religion, while the religion which is not syncretic believes it is correct for the opposite reason. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/2

20

MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
MACGRADY1.DOC

2002]

1/22/2021 3:50 PM

ANOTHER COUNCIL OF NICAEA?

391

analogy was intended to show that there are simply different ways to
perceive what is correct legal reasoning, like there are different ways to
perceive what is correct religious faith. Yet, in the end, it is unavoidable
and indeed necessary that each group will maintain that its system is the
true one. 119 An example is the Council of Nicaea; once the Nicene
Creed was established, the “Arian heresy” group split off, each group
thinking they were correct. In other words, there are two fundamentally
different legal theorist groups of constitutional interpretation, and neither
will ever come to terms with the other. The originalists and the noninterpretivists cannot accept the other.
Balkin does not appear to have a problem, philosophically, with this
split. His writings purport to encourage self-reflection of ideological
differences. He knows that there are originalists, and that he is not one
of them. He has, in fact, played his faithful “religious” role and decried
the opposing religion, originalism, as heresy. In his writings, Balkin has
affirmed the importance of the internal point of view, but unlike some
others, he problematizes internal perspective. 120 Yet at the same time,
Balkin invites us to view all interpretations as subjectively based, and
therefore subject to critical perspective: “In both what we call legal understanding and what we assign to legal misunderstanding, the subject
has already intruded and brought her fore-understandings, prejudgments
and psychological needs to bear. The subject is already part of the constructed object of interpretation; her invisibility is already reflected in
the object’s nature.” 121
So, before Balkin arrives at the Brown panel, where does that leave
him? It appears to leave him philosophically content with his own “internal experience of the law,” for it is not “wicked” or “evil” (he does
not support such evils as racism and sexism). It leaves him in the “religion” of the nonoriginalists or noninterpretivists whose postmodern purpose it is to take the diachronical law handed to them from history and
apply it to today’s society. Apparently, the only mandatory constitutional or precedential authority is an amorphous democratic ideal and goal of
rejecting social hierarchy. Balkin wants us to remember that what the
Supreme Court has said in the past is never unequivocally important.
Judges have made mistakes, because they generally only answer to the
demands of the public, not the constitutional governmental framework.
119. Id.
120. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legalist Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L. J. 105, 110-11 (1993) (contrasting his view with Hart and
Dworkin who do not make problematic the internal viewer).
121. Id. at 111.
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In fact, it is in many cases better to ignore what the actual Constitution
or the Supreme Court (or the originalists) have said, because they have
been known to inculcate “evil.” And even if the constitutional provisions are not actually evil, many of them are, at least, for sure, stupid. 122
2. And What He Says Now
Sitting as the Chief Justice on the Panel, Professor Balkin weighs in
at the podium announcing that segregation is unlawful. He described
Brown as a “legal classic” and an “icon,” which was a Rorschach test for
institutional theory, an interesting point not pursued directly by him or
any other panelist. He further stated that Brown meant different things
to different people. It was appropriate, he continued, to consider
Brown’s effectiveness since the results are mixed and the public schools
remain largely segregated today. No one seriously pursued that topic either. The Panelists were to look at contemporary theories and contemporary concerns, but subject to the rule of the game that you knew then
in 1954, what you know now about the “course of history of this country.”
First, in his panel offering, Professor Balkin indicated that he considers the actual intent of those responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment to be inconclusive, acknowledging that others on the Panel did not
agree. Professors Mackinnon, Days, Bell and Ely for starters, he might
have added, had no problem with this intent situation. If the intent is unclear, we are then apparently free to find an intent “out there.” So, there
is a bit of tension here between Balkin’s assertion that the Framers and
Ratifiers did not wish to outlaw segregation, and his claim that the intent
was unclear.
But Balkin finds the intent unclear, so we may initially think that
must be because segregation violates the democratic ideal and goal of
social equality. For, after all, that is what Balkin had always asserted
was the most (or only) important and reliable feature of the Constitutional tradition. But, no. Balkin now tells us that segregation is unconstitutional based not only on the Framers’ intent behind the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also on substantive, structural, and textual grounds.
Suddenly, Balkin is reaching outside his postmodernistic, diachronical
world to find that the Framers’ intent did not support segregation.
Though Balkin concedes that it is at best, inconclusive whether the Ratifiers’ of the Fourteenth Amendment intended segregation to be constitu122. See generally J.M. Balkin, The Constitution as a Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 147 (1995).
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tional, he goes on to argue that the basic principle behind the Amendment is equal citizenship. To the Ratifiers, however, equal citizenship
for Blacks meant civic equality (e.g., testifying in court), but not political (e.g., voting) or social equality. Social equality certainly could not
have been intended, Balkin tells us, because many of the Ratifers wanted
Blacks to remain inferior for all time. Despite their prejudice, however,
Balkin reassures us they had the foresight to use language that “conveyed full and unalloyed equality.” 123
Balkin then informs us that even though the Ratifiers may have only intended Blacks to have civic equality, they soon were given, at least
formally, political and social equality by courts. 124 Under Plessy, however, social equality meant “separate but equal” was the order of the day.
The states, up to that point and especially thereafter, continued to support and enforce social subordination of the Blacks. Nonetheless, the
Ratifiers’ intent that Blacks would only be allowed civic, but not political and social, equality was becoming unworkable and, ultimately, exploded. (Presumably this explosion was only coincidental to the “foresight” of the Ratifiers’ language because it was factors other than that
language that gave rise to the realization. In other words, the law
changed not based on any clear “foresight” of the Constitution’s language but because of social factors. It would thus seem that the Constitution was not so clear after all, or if changes were in line with the Constitution it was not because anyone had cared how clear the language
was.).
Then Balkin introduces the Declaration of Independence and Jacksonian principles against class legislation to support the idea that equality of citizenship is inherent to our constitutional government. The
Framers were not only against privileges for special groups, but against
disadvantages for certain groups. This, apparently, trumps any equivocation in the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Education, moreover, is a
fundamental interest, and states have an affirmative duty to provide
equal education for all citizens when they subsidize public education.
Balkin does not refer to the word “education” in the Constitution. The
finding of education as a fundamental interest nicely takes care of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
which denied that school districts had to achieve some parity in education resource allocation. Rodriquez would be reversed because educa-

123. See Balkin, supra note 17.
124. Id. Balkin cites Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) and Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tion resources should be equalized because of a nebulous Constitutional.
On Bolling v. Sharp, the case involving federal discrimination in
schooling in the District of Columbia, Balkin then had one structural and
three textual arguments to support the assertion that the federal government cannot segregate any more than the states can. His structural argument was that “it means little” and “makes no sense” if the states cannot segregate, but the federal government can. For this he cites the First
Amendment, which states that Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, which, according to written material from the University of Minnesota, means that the Executive and Judicial branches
cannot make such law, either. He does not tell us what special authority
the University of Minnesota had. 125
Then he starts reading the constitutional text, something which he
has warned his readers against doing because, let us recall, it may be
evil, or if not, plainly stupid. First, he argues that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause’s reference to all persons are citizens creates a national citizenship and implies equality. Second, he announces that the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “all persons born
or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States” has
major significance. This, apparently, is another obvious clue about national citizenship and its implied equal citizenship. It does not permit
two classes of citizenship. (It also does not prohibit it, but Balkin ignores this). Third, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, “as we all
know,” includes the concept of equal protection. (Professor Ely does not
“know this” and strenuously resisted it during the Panel discussion).
This was done to “make explicit to the Southern states what was already
implicit”——they cannot treat Blacks as second-class citizens. Balkin
gives us no cite for this, either.
Setting aside the question of whether Balkin should or could actually believe any of these arguments, the larger issue is, given his paper
trail and what it says, whether Balkin is acting like his enemies——the
originalist, the positivist, or the formalist. He has always warned his
readers that this form of legal reasoning is illogical, evil, stupid, or just
plain wrong. He has told us that the Ratifiers embraced slavery and social subordination of Blacks, so be wary of them. He has told us that the
Supreme Court makes mistakes and generally follows public opinion,
not the Constitution. He has told us that the rule of law is diachronical,
and changes with time, so do not look too far into the past for a synchronic answer. And yet, what is he doing now? He is reading Supreme
125. See Balkin, supra note 17.
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Court cases, and citing to them, even favorably. 126 He is telling us, on
the one hand, that the intent of the Ratifiers was to promote equality of
citizenship, but on the other hand that many of them wanted Blacks to be
forever subordinate (?!). He is reading the text of the Constitution, verbatim, and telling us that it supports that intention.
What is Balkin doing? One would find it hard to believe that he
could go so far as to contradict everything he has ever written as true
about the rule of law, legal reasoning, and society. His former writings
remain antithetical to his panel opinion. Perhaps the answer is that Balkin is trying to set an example for us, showing us how Supreme Courts,
“with their peculiar brand of justice,” 127 “discover” 128 constitutionality to
support what their surrounding society demands.
Perhaps, we are invited to take home the message that today, even
though when Brown was actually decided the opposite was true, it is uniformly (or at least formally) strictly taboo, immoral, even evil, to advocate segregation or racial discrimination. Therefore, the Brown Panel
(and the Supreme Court) had to find segregation unconstitutional. There
was no choice, other than what would come down to virtual banishment.
It is reminiscent of what the Council of Nicaea may well have been
thinking: Our society demands that we stand together on this one, so we
must do so, no matter what the text actually says, no matter what we
ourselves have said or believed before.
Perhaps an important lesson here is the fragile nature of orthodoxy.
Brown was not bathed in orthodoxy when it was rendered. It was highly
controversial. In the parallel arena of religion, Borges reminds us of the
fragile nature of orthodoxy. In controversies precedent to the Council of
Nicaea in 325 CE over the relation of Jesus to God, Borges tells us the
story of an original orthodoxy which Bishops John and Aurelian had
embraced. They were rivals and Aurelian wrote a better defense of the
current orthodoxy than John, according to the ruling church authorities.
In writing the attack on heresy, Aurelian stated the orthodoxy and his
refutation became the Church’s official one. Later, orthodoxy completely changed, and John used Aurelian’s statement of the old orthodoxy in
his (John’s) refutation. This cost Aurelian his life when John was asked

126. Such as Strauder, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which gave blacks the right to sit on juries, and
Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which said Blacks had social equality. He cites these as evidence that
the distinction between civic and political equality became untenable, and ultimately exploded.
127. See Introduction, 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 5-9, 2000) in AALS
2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 195 (Recorded Resources Corp.).
128. See Canon, supra note 89, at 1023.
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to disclose where he got the statement of the old orthodoxy, (which was
now heresy) and he identified his rival, Aurelian. 129
Perhaps also the Panelists were reflecting a need to stand together
on an important societal issue. Could there be a similarity between the
legitimacy of religion to the bishops at Nicaea and the legitimacy of “our
lady the common law” to the Panelists? Otherwise our ability to slide in
our own values could be jeopardized if that legitimacy is undermined.
B. Professor Catherine MacKinnon
Professor MacKinnon’s conflicted positions are illustrated by the
following in capsule form. On the one hand, her Panel opinion adopts
formalism to approve Brown, finding objective harm to Blacks from desegregation. But to do so, she smuggles in her own equality principle
taken supposedly from Aristotle, though her writings distance herself
from the working out of that principle in Aristotle’s time and presently.
Further, her writings suggest that law is manipulated by dominant males
to make that world comfortable for them, and whatever the powerless
(like Blacks and women) get is offhand, and designed to keep them hoping for more, which is not likely to be forthcoming under the current
dispensation. MacKinnon stands delicately poised between the contradiction of accepting the fruits of Court action (Brown) and rejecting it
because it is male dominated and can be used by the dominant class to
keep women hoping for good results thereby legitimating it.
1. What She Wrote Before
Catharine MacKinnon’s candidacy as a Brown Panelist may stem
from the frequency with which she has compared women’s situation to
that of Blacks, often citing Brown and the problem of racial discrimination in her previous writings, 130 which have predominantly been in the
129. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Theologians, in COLLECTED FICTIONS (1998).
130. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 44, 167 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. “The best attempt at grasping women’s situation
in order to change it by law has centered on an analogy between sex and race in the discrimination
context.”; Id. at 167, “Consider this analogy with race: if you see Black people as different, there is
no harm to segregation; it is merely a recognition of that difference. . . . Similarly, if you see women as just different, even or especially if you don’t know that you do, subordination will not look
like subordination at all, much less like harm. It will merely look like an appropriate recognition of
the sex difference” (attacking neutral principles); Id. at 178, “In [Brown], it took one study to show
that the harm of segregation was that it affected the hearts and minds of Black children, gave them a
sense of their inferiority, and affected their feeling of status in the community in a way that was unlikely ever to be undone. How do you suppose it affects the hearts and minds of women. . . .” (arguing that as done for Blacks in Brown, studies need to be done for women in pornography); Id. at
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feminist field. She has based her arguments for sex equality on the same
premises which have been used for race equality: “The primary point of
reference for antidiscrimination law has not been the social situation and
experience of women, but that of black Americans, or at least of black
men.” 131 While this analogy with blacks may have seemingly made her
an opportune Panelist, her Brown opinion resonates of originalism and
formalism, spawning a tension with her understanding of history, society, law, and the legal system. In her writings, she has maintained that
throughout U.S. history, society and its law have always been, and still
are, intrinsically unequal because only white (property-holding) males
have made, and essentially still do make, the rules. Our Constitutional
tradition has never been one of equality. 132 Throughout her writings, the
202; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE. (Harvard Univ.
Press 1989) [hereinafter “TOWARD”], 153, “[P]erhaps it would help to think of women’s sexuality
as women’s like Black culture is Blacks’ . . . .”; 240 (discussing how law occasionally sides with the
powerless, citing Brown); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION. (Yale Univ. Press 1979) [hereinafter “HARASSMENT”],
“Segregation is more or less accepted as a dirty word when applied to separation on the basis of
race. . . . But there seems to be a social sense that it is somehow appropriate, or at least not without
some just foundation, to divide labor according to sex.”; Id. at 17. “A parallel with race illustrates
the difficulty with the distinction between the personal and the social implicit in these cases. . . .
The assumption that relations between women and men occur in a personal sphere is directly analogous to the assumption once held by whites who lived in intimate daily contact with blacks. . . . By
analogy to race, the fact that a sexual relation between a woman and a man is felt to be personal
does not exempt it from helping to perpetuate women’s subordinate place in the workplace and in
society as a whole.”; Id. at 88-89. “Often when courts are confronted with a massive social problem
which has been ignored, the first response is ‘administrative’ concern for the legal system. . . . The
same can be said for women’s legal rights as a whole and of the rights of racial and national minorities.” Id. at 97; See supra note 122. “The candid admission that women are regarded as inferior
parallels the assessment in Plessy of skin color as property. . . . To apply Blackstone’s analysis in a
racial context, a property interest in an inferior defines the institution of slavery.” HARASSMENT,
supra note 130, at 169. “[Attitudes towards women and women in the workplace] resembl[e] the
white supremacist logic of of depriving blacks of the tools of an education . . .” Id. at 196. (arguing
race equality law should be the basis of sex equality law) Id. at 137; (comparing women, as blacks,
to white men) Id. at 273 n.87 (citations omitted).
131. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 127 (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993)
[hereinafter ONLY WORDS], (“Originally, of course, the Constitution contained no equality guarantee. . . . [T]he First Amendment has grown as if a committment to speech were no part of a committment to equality and as if a committment to equality had no implications for the law of
speech—as if the upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not move the ground.
. . .” Id.; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law [hereinafter “Reflections”], 100 YALE L. J. 1281 (1991). “Equality was not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights.” Id. at 1282. “No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the social order under which women, as well as men, live.” Id. at 1281. “In the United states, many men
were also excluded from the official founding process. African American men and women were
considered property. Indigenous peoples were to be subdued rather than consulted. Non-property
owners were not qualified to participate in most states.” Id. at 1281 n. 2. (citing C. BEARD, AN
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elemental cry has been: Equality for women is inequality. 133
MacKinnon has heralded that the liberal state is founded upon
(white) male supremacy, 134 which has been jurisprudentially reinforced. 135 “Male power is systemic. Coercive, legitimated, and epistemic, it is the regime.” 136 Laws are by and for men. Those with power,
usually men, write Constitutions and laws which become precedent;
courts cannot and do not go beyond their designated scope, unable to
scrutinize the underlying substance of legislation. 137 The world,
MacKinnon has informed us, “actually arranges itself to affirm what the
powerful want to see.” 138 The powerful, of course, are male. The law
those males make are only words. 139
The male point of view is adopted as the “gender equality” stand140
Male dominance is kept “invisible and legitimate” through
ard.
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64-72 (1913))
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 36 (discussing that what is male defines everything in
society and history); Id. “[T]he principle of equality has been interpreted to affirm specific white
and male cultural values as ‘the standard’ . . . . Equality has come to mean a right to be treated like
the white man when you can show you are like him.” Id. at 63. “[P]resumptions [that] underlie the
First Amendment do not apply to women. . . .” Id. at 129. (discussing pornography); “[T]he obscenity standard—in this it is not unique—is built on what the male standpoint sees.” Id. at 148; “[W]e
can’t tell much about the intent of the framers with regard to the question of women’s speech, because I don’t think we crossed their minds.” Id. at 195. “The First Amendment was written by
those who already had the speech; they also had slaves, many of them, and owned women.”
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 204. “[Women] were let into [the legal] profession on
the implicit condition that we would enforce the real rules: women kept out and down, sexual access
to women enforced.” Id. at 205. “For women [the ‘negative liberty’ posture which is ‘a cornerstone
of the liberal state’] means that those domains in which women are distinctively subordinated are
assumed by the Constitution to be the domain of freedom . . . . Equality, in the words of Andrea
Dworkin, was tacked on to the Constitution with spit and a prayer. And, let me also say, late.” Id.
at 207; TOWARD, supra note 130, at 182 (discussing that rape law is defined as how men see it,
not women); HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 131 “Women’s specific historical forms of subordination . . . have yet to be the subject of a constitutional prohibition.” Id.
133. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 171 “[T]he view that basically
the sexes are equal in this society remains unchallenged and unchanged. The day I got this was the
day I understood its real message, its real coherence: This is equality for us.” Id.
134. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 162 (“The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender—through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies.”).
135. Id. at 163 (“The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of
male power on the relation between law and society. This stance is especially vivid in constitutional
adjudication, thought legitimate to the degree it is neutral on the policy content of legislation.”).
136. Id. at 170.
137. Id. at 238.
138. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech“”, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) [hereinafter “Pornography”].
139. Id. at 65. See generally ONLY WORDS, supra note 132.
140. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 221. MacKinnon opposes Weschler’s neutral principles.
See, e.g., Pornography, supra note 138, at 6.
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adopting this male standard, and is maintained and upheld via the medium of “liberal legalism” which simultaneously “enforces that view on
society.” 141 Both society and the judiciary have failed to recognize the
true disposition of gender classifications, and courts have remained relatively “backward and entrenched.” 142 According to MacKinnon, the liberal view underlying this “neutrality” approach is that abstract categories
such as equality or speech define systems, and when you strengthen
equality or speech in one place in society, you strengthen it everywhere.
The problem with this neutrality approach is that it fails to recognize that
substantive systems like male supremacy are just as much systems as abstract systems. 143
Sex discrimination law is not “real” and does not “work”; it is men
who think it does. 144 MacKinnon would attest that this is partly because
most of the cases shaping sex discrimination doctrine that have reached
the U.S. Supreme Court since 1971 have been brought (and won) by
white men “seeking access to the few benefits women had.” 145 For example, when it comes to pornography, it is only when male children
came before the Supreme Court that it “understood that before the pornography became the pornographer’s speech, it was somebody’s life.” 146
Only then was child pornography illegalized.
MacKinnon has repeatedly attacked courts for not giving women in
pornography the same legal protection children have been given. Courts
have held that the harm pornography does is not as important as the free
speech associated with the materials. 147 She attacks female judges for
upholding pornography, yet apparently waters down that attack by
claiming that women who achieve male forms of power will behave like
men, and that women in power are usually accountable to men. 148 She
141. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 237.
142. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 129.
143. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 164-65.
144. See PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 138, at 10-11.
145. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 227. See also, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note
130, at 64 (if no white male is present it is just a fact if you are poorly paid or educated—not discrimination).
146. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 179 (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982)).
147. See, e.g., id. “I take it seriously when Justice Douglas speaking on pornography and others preaching absolutism say that pornography has to be protected speech or else free expression
will not mean what it has always meant in this country.” Id. at 209. attacking Judge Easterbrook in
the 7th Circuit for holding pornography is free speech. Id. at 210.
148. Id. at 219-20. MacKinnon has elsewhere watered-down (insulted?) conservative women’s
responsibility for their actions or thoughts, “ . . . ERA [Equal Rights Amendment] activists blamed
conservative women for failing to support their version of sex equality more than they blamed what
such women were up against for undermining the ERA’s appeal to them. . . . dispossessed can be
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has attacked courts for telling us that materials that contain defamatory
ideas are protected speech, even though those materials “discriminate
against women from objectification to murder.” 149 She has gone so far
as to assert, “Sometimes I think that what is ultimately found obscene is
what does not turn on the Supreme Court . . . .” 150
MacKinnon argues that the “differences” approach to sex discrimination, which courts usually take, does not work. The problem is that
the standard for determining discrimination is male. The quintessal example is pregnancy; because men cannot get pregnant (cannot be similarly situated) it is not discrimination to treat women differently. This
approach ignores that the male is still the standard against which the
woman is judged; the differences are then allowed to be “relevant,” and
courts can easily get around equality by rationalizing the social subordination of women. 151 The measuring stick for equality as male is neutral
in its mainstream interpretation: “it gives little to women that it cannot
also give to men, maintaining sex inequality while appearing to address
it.” 152 The reality is that sex discrimination law prohibits almost nothing
that socially disadvantages only women. 153 The liberal neutrality approach is a mirage.
MacKinnon has denounced liberalism as elitist and anti-feminist. 154
She has maintained that liberalism accomplishes little in the way of sex
equality because liberalism’s methodological and “magical” approach is
to create laws and then pretend they are reality. Her perception of liberalism is that it assumes equality exists already when it does not, making
it “almost impossible to produce equality by law.” 155 This, MacKinnon

maneuvered into doing themselves in, a feature proponents and opponents of ERA share.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 763 (1987).
149. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 38.
150. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 153. She has also attacked the Supreme
Court of Minnesota for holding pornography as an “idea” and hence speech while simultaneously
observing that “even the most liberal construction would be strained to find an ‘idea’ in it.” ONLY
WORDS, supra note 132, at 14 (citation omitted). She has frequently attacked the Hudnut Court for
upholding pornography as free speech, saying that its effects depend upon “mental intermediation”.
See, e.g., ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 18 (citing American Booksellers Ass’n Inc. v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985)).
151. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 119, 121. She attacks the Gilbert court for holding that a
company is not prevented on sex discrimination grounds from not covering pregnancy and other
female-related ailments on its insurance policy while that policy did cover certain ailments which
only affect men. Id. at 187-88.
152. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 168.
153. Id. at 222.
154. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 205.
155. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 231.
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asserts, is nothing but an illusion. 156 “Both the liberal and the left view
rationalize male power by presuming that it does not exist, that equality
between the sexes . . . is society’s basic norm. . . .” 157 The solution offered by liberalism has been tolerance, which MacKinnon finds just another means by which those in power keep what they want. 158 Liberal
equality offers women whatever men have always had, and what men
have always had is access to women. Therefore, abstract equality undermines and reinforces substantive inequality. 159 “[S]ex equality is
conceptually designed in law never to be achieved.” 160
When it comes to rape and women’s sexuality, “[t]o be property
would be an improvement” for women. 161 The crime of rape is defined
from the male point of view, and men are systematically conditioned to
not recognize what women want. 162 The social standard is stacked
against women because if women cannot prove rape in court, they were
not raped. The state may perpetuate rape victims’ experiences by forcing them to relive the rape again in court. 163 MacKinnon has implied
that rape laws do not work, because it generally takes three women testifying to the same or similar treatment to overcome one man saying that a
woman consented. 164
Similarly, with respect to pornography, women’s only protection is
obscenity laws, and the obscenity standard is built on what is seen from
the male standpoint. 165 “[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a
fight among men over the best means to guarantee male power as a system.” 166 Obscenity law is only words; 167 it actually helps perpetuate
156. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 219. “The procedure is: imagine the future you want, construct actions or legal rules or social practices as if we were already there, and
that will get us from here to there. This magical approach to social change, which is methodologically liberal, lives entirely in the head, a head that is more determined by present reality than it is
taking seriously, yet it is not sufficiently grounded in that reality to do anything about it.” Id.
157. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 249.
158. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 15.
159. Id. at 14.
160. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 233.
161. Id. at 172. See also id. at 242 (“Sex equality in law has not been meaningfully defined for
women, but has been defined and limited from the male point of view to correspond with the existing social reality of sex inequality.”).
162. Id. at 180-81. See also, HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 163 (“[M]en are responsible
only if they know they are sexually offensive, and nothing in the law requires (or even strongly encourages) them to know what their conduct means to women.”).
163. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 179-80. MacKinnon also notes that women do not report
rapes (or sexual harassment) because they are not legal injuries, or women are not in a social position to complain. HARASSMENT, supra note 30 at 160.
164. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 293-94, n.107.
165. Id. at 148.
166. Id. at 153.
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pornography because “[o]bscenity is the legal device through which it is
legally repudiated but legally permitted.”168 What is obscene is set by
social standards, and what is standard is set by pornography.
The legality of abortion is another example MacKinnon has given
of a law written by and for men; the availability of abortion “enhances
the availability of intercourse.” 169 According to MacKinnon, laws concerning sexual assault and harassment are consistent with a dominant
male’s sexual pleasure. 170 The privacy doctrine used to uphold the abortion right is perfect for the liberal state, MacKinnon informs us, because
the right to privacy is actually about men’s right “to be let alone” and to
oppress women individually. 171 MacKinnon has also attacked the right
to privacy doctrine as allowing wife-beating, 172 prostitution and sexual
abuse, because one meaning of privacy is, effectively, “the right to dominate free of public scrutiny.” 173 When abuse is done to women in private it is termed consensual and thus acceptable, and when it is done
through pornography it is termed speech and thus constitutional. 174
Women can fight, and have fought, male supremacy, but have never been able to conquer it. 175 MacKinnon has illustrated these opinions
with analogies to chickens and rats. In some old behavioral experiments, chickens were divided into three groups: the first got fed every
time they pecked; the second, every other time; the third, at random.

167. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 88-89. “Equally difficult in practice has been the
requirement in the obscenity test that community standards be proven violated. The more pornography there is, the more it sets de facto community standards, conforming views of what is acceptable to what is arousing. . . . In other words, inequality is allowed to set community standards for the
treatment of women. . . . This irrelevant and unworkable tool is then placed in the hands of the
state, most of whose actors have little interest in stopping [the abuse to women in pornography] but
a substantial interest in avoiding prosecutions they cannot win. The American law of obscenity, as
a result, is only words.” Id.
168. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 201.
169. Id. at 188 (“In this context it becomes clear why the struggle for reproductive freedom has
never included a woman’s right to refuse sex.”).
170. Reflections, supra note 132, at 1300-01.
171. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 190, 194 (citations omitted).
172. HARRASSMENT, supra note 130, at 160, “Women’s attempts to gain legal redress and protection from domestic victimization are infamously ineffectual. This suggests that intimate assaults
on women by men are ignored even when they are reported. . . .” Id.
173. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 14
(1993). “The private is then defined as a place of freedom by effectively rendering consensual what
women and children are forced to do out of the public eye. Prostitution is thus often referred to as
occurring in private between consenting adults, as is marriage and family. The result is to extend the
aura of privacy and protection from public intervention from sex to sexual abuse.” Id. at 14-15.
174. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 15.
175. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 138 (“Women often find ways to resist male supremacy
and to expand their spheres of action. But they are never free of it.”).
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The first group stopped trying to peck immediately when the food was
cut off; the second stopped soon after; but the third never stopped trying.
In a different experiment, rats received shocks every time they tried to
leave their cage. Women, MacKinnon analogizes, are rewarded like the
third group of chickens and punished like the rats: “[W]e peck forever
for the occasional crumb that seems to reward our efforts and reinforces
our hopes out of all proportion to reality, and we spend the rest of our
time skulking in the corners of the cages we no longer try to leave.” 176
Those performing the experiments, so to speak, come from both the
left and the right. For example, MacKinnon has noted that the posture
that women’s abuse in pornography is the “thought” or “emotion” of the
pornographer (the pornographer’s constitutionally protected speech)
unites “libertarian economist and judge Frank Easterbrook,” “liberal philosopher-king Ronald Dworkin,” “conservative scholar and judge Richard Posner,” and “pornographers’ lawyer Edward DeGrazia.” 177 According to MacKinnon, when it comes to pornography, at least, the left
and the right are two roads to the same goal: male dominance. Judges in
the U.S., on the left and the right, “together with politicians, journalists,
and pornographers” also have a single goal: making injury through pornography actionable as sex discrimination a violation of the First
Amendment. 178 The strategies: the conservatives cover up pornography
with obscenity law, while the liberals parade it as tolerance and free
speech. 179
It is not only men on the left and the right in the U.S. which have
come together in the male dominance goal—it is men globally. Under
international human rights laws, systemic and systematic violations to
women do not apply. 180 MacKinnon has told how U.N. and Serbian soldiers together raped Muslim and Croatian women, 181 how men internationally condone violent behavior towards women in war, and how although these acts flagrantly violate women’s rights, far too often, nothing
is done. 182 Raped women are told to go to the state for help, but men run

176. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 226-27.
177. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 10.
178. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 143,
147-48 (1995).
179. Id. at 161. MacKinnon also attacks the liberals for attacking the conservatives’ obscenity
law and then siding with them when pornography comes along. Id. at 145-46.
180. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 59,
60-61 (1993) [hereinafter “Crimes”].
181. Id. at 67-68.
182. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, 17 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J 5, 6-7 (1994).
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the states, make the laws, and enforce them at will. State sovereign immunity protects each state’s lack of protection for women. MacKinnon
sees this as what looks like a global fraternity pact: “When men sit in
rooms being states, they are largely being men. They protect each other;
they identify with each other; they try not to limit each other in ways
they themselves do not want to be limited.” 183 The inference is she
questions if there is hope for the system because the guardian/protectors
(the U.N. soldiers) are in cahoots with the Serbs and their rape/death
camps. 184
However, MacKinnon does not appear too shocked by this international conspiracy, so to speak. She sees male dominance as a trend that
began at least with Aristotle’s “likes and unlikes” philosophy, 185 continuing through the Enlightenment, the Nazi Regime, mainstream U.S.
equality jurisprudence, and then on to international human rights. 186 She
has elsewhere stated that most sexism is “unconscious” or “well-meant;”
that men are “systematically conditioned” not to recognize women’s
wants or feelings. 187 So, although men see women as second-class citizens, 188 MacKinnon has almost given an apology for this treatment. One
may infer that a fundamental reason why she questions whether there is
hope for “the system” is that the sexism is not only so pervasive, but so
unconscious. 189
From this discussion of the pervasiveness, unconsciousness, and
universality of sexism, it is not difficult to trust in MacKinnon’s veracity
when she solidly maintains that the Constitution was not originally, and
still is not, founded upon equality. 190 That is, because the sociological
and psychological 191 roots of sexism run so deep, discernible at least
183. Id. at 15.
184. Crimes, supra note 180, at 67-68 (women have no rights in the war context).
185. Aristotle maintained that things which are like should be treated alike and things which
are unlike should be treated unalike. MacKinnon has written, “That women were apparently so different to Aristotle as not to be treated unequally under his principle when excluded from citizenship
has not been regarded as a drawback or an indication that something is amiss.” Id at 72.
186. Id. at 81.
187. TOWARDS, supra note 130, at 230; 181 (“systematically conditioned”, discussing rape).
188. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 118-19.
189. See generally id. The pervasiveness may also be illustrated by what MacKinnon calls the
“institution” of heterosexuality, which is suggested as functioning as yet another form of the widespread oppression of women. Id. at 60-61. Further, even men who are homosexually assaulted are
actually assaulted as women, because they are feminized and “stripped of their social status of
men.” Oncale v. Sundower Offshoreservices, Inc., 96-568, Amici Curiae Brief Insupport of Petitioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 9, 15, 19 (1997). This, according to MacKinnon is another act reflecting a male dominant heterosexual culture. 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. at 19.
190. Supra note 132.
191. MacKinnon is also vehemently against Freudianism.
See, e.g., FEMINISM
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since the days of Aristotle, it is only natural that the U.S. Constitution’s
“We the People” actually included only certain, privileged white males.
MacKinnon seems conflicted on the Constitution. She is not bothered by the notion of constitutional evil as Balkin is, because the Constitution as interpreted does not deserve fidelity. She has gone one step
further than Balkin and disassociated herself with the Constitution, at
least as it is presently interpreted. 192 She has also rejected Ronald
Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution as elitist and exclusionary. She claims her own “aggressive” reading of the Constitution is not
founded upon her own pontification of what she feels is right or wrong
and thus should be law. She has explicitly denied that her project is to
engage in “theorizing morally” when answering the question of how the
Constitution can be made legitimate. 193
Her basic strategy, on the surface, is to presume that the Constitution provides for equality, and must now only be made to live up to it.
Yet her argument is flawed and circular from the beginning. She concedes that the Constitution may be forced to live up to its “equality
promise” for the first time in history, and that holding the Constitution to
its “equality promise” does not stem from belief in the Constitution itself
but belief in people’s equality. She announces that we should not allow
the Constitution to make people less than equal. 194 But the Constitution
prohibits the unequal. 195 Does the Equal Protection Clause contain her
equality principle or not? If not, she says it should.
This reasoning is perplexing. It is contradictory. If the Constitution prohibits inequality, how does it simultaneously make people less
than equal? Bad interpretations? If holding the Constitution to its equality promise does not stem from the Constitution itself where does it
come from? From experiences of people, e.g., women? Does the Constitution hold such a promise, or not? She claims that “if” the Constitu-

UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 51, 205.
192. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Freedom from Unreal Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation“”, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773, 1773-74 (1997) [hereinafter “Loyalties”]. See
also Balkin section, supra , for discussion of constitutional evil.
193. Loyalties, supra note 192, at 1773.
194. See id. at 1775. “Do you give up on the Constitution. . . . [o]r do you decide to hold the
Constitution up to its promise, for the first time if necessary? If you take this ‘bottom up’ approach,
it is not because you believe in the Constitution, although you might, but because you believe in the
equality of your people, and you are not going to let the Constitution make them less.” Id.
195. Id. at 1776-77. Presumably this is a reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, which she
mentions specifically. Id. at 1776. She argues that whether one group is treated equally is an equal
protection concern, at least when interpreted from the point of view of women and others treated
unequally. Id. Whether this treatment is morally wrong is another question. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 2
MACGRADY1.DOC

406

1/22/2021 3:50 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

tion had no equality promise, she would “be trying to get one in.” 196 It
sure sounds like this is what she is doing already, despite her claims
against “theorizing morally,” against moral readings of the Constitution.
Her insistence upon her equality principle is a moral judgment.
2. And What She Says Now
In every sense, MacKinnon’s concurring Panel opinion does not
elucidate the above Constitutional contradictions, but confounds them.
Early in her opinion she cites to the “equality rule,” which is presumably
synonymous with her previously discussed “equality promise”— the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “purpose and promise” of equality. 197 Yet, in
her familiar manner of discorded logic, she also announces that Constitutional equality guarantee has no definition. 198 Yet, she concedes that
segregation on the basis of race was seen as Constitutionally equal, and
that Plessy and its progeny were wrong. Is she not then saying that
equality indeed does have a definition after all, but that it is wrong?
Perhaps she means to say: “we need to redefine this definition”— not
define it?
To support her concurrence that Plessy was wrong, she cites to the
lower courts’ findings regarding the infamous psychology study that
found that segregation does harm to black children. She makes much of
the point of damages—that the black children are objectively and not
simply subjectively harmed by the segregation officially imposed upon
them. 199 She demands that we assume that blacks and whites’ intellectual capacity is the same. 200 She holds white supremacy responsible for
the creation and perpetuation of caste. She finds this castism “inimical
to an equality rule.” There it is again, the infamous equality rule.
She cites Shelley v. Kramer as supporting the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to “dismantle precisely the substantive
reality of imposed systematic inferiority of black to white.” She quotes
Justice Harlan’s dissent from Plessy, which stated that the statute then in
question was really about keeping blacks away from whites; it had noth196. Id. at 1779.
197. See Professor MacKinnon, Address at the 2000 Annual Constitutional Meeting (Jan. 5-9,
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196
(Recorded Resources Corp.).
198. She says, “This case requires us to define no less than what equality as guaranteed by the
Constitution means.” See id.
199. This was the Plessy Courts’ reasoning. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
200. This assumption has been rejected by some. See generally CHARLES MURRAY AND
RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1994).
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ing to do with equality. 201 As done in her previous writings, she attacks
segregation and the similarly situated rule as nothing but the inequality
we have inherited from Aristotle and his likes/dislikes philosophy. She
proceeds to make the analogy with the Nuremburg laws of the Third
Reich. This spattering of selected precedent, for what it may be worth in
supporting her concurrence, is difficult to square with her claim that the
Framers’ purpose is “clear:” “to promote equality.” (Again, presumably
she is referring to the Fourteenth Amendment Framers, not the original
Framers.) How can one tell, no less determine that, from a “Constitution
that reflects an unequal society” a “clear” equality purpose is to be
found? How can a society historically hierarchically stratified—and
let’s remember her talk of pervasive unconscious sexism—reflect a
“clear” purpose of an equality promise, unless one is willing to admit
that equality simply meant something different to the Framers (any set of
them) than it does to some today?
In the end, the equality promise is not so “clear.” MacKinnon admits that it stems from a “contextualized historical determination.” She
admits that resistance to change makes change slow. One can only conclude from this statement that the “equality promise” she would like to
read in the Constitution, Plessy’s dissent, Shelley, or elsewhere, is not
the same as what the Framers and society have historically understood
equality to mean. If it were the same equality, it would not need to be
changed. In sum, MacKinnon’s panel opinion starts with the nebulous
“equality promise,” and is supported by a few selective pieces of precedent. She makes the bold assertion that the Framers’ purpose is clearly
to promote this equality, but consistently diffuses her own argument.
The consistency lies in the discorded logic which is found from her previous writings and continues into her panel opinion. 202

201. Regarding Plessy, she also says, “The upshot of Plessy’s reasonable test is to promote
what might be called rational discrimination, that basically when enough social equality has been
achieved over inequalities that have been systematically imposed, official segregation will no longer
be reasonable.” The meaning of this is very unclear. See MacKinnon, supra note 197.
202. It may also be noted that her sentences and thoughts are often hard to follow and decipher.
This is similar to confusion that can be found in her writings. For example, in HARASSMENT, supra
note 130, at 110 she wrote the following confusing paragraph: “What changed between Plessy and
Brown was the implicit standard for what would be seen to be a reasonable difference in the social
position of the races. In the Plessy perspective, the poignant evidence of the damage segregation
does to children which supported the Brown result could have supported the opposite legal result—
that blacks were different, thus deserving of different, that is, separate, educational treatment. In
Brown, only racial differences which were not based on racial inequality were ‘reasonable’—hence,
there were no reasonable racial differences.” HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 110 (citations omitted). It is also interesting to note that she has written, “We purport to want to change things, but we
talk in ways that no one understands. . . . [discusses that most women are illiterate]. . . . I’m not
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C. Professor Michael McConnell
In a nutshell, our reading of McConnell is as follows. His basic position is one of originalism, paralleling the Nicaean dispute over text and
inclusion of facts outside the text. McConnell rightly criticizes Ackerman and company for what he (McConnell) called bait-and-switch. Bait
and switch for McConnell is doctrinal manipulation to achieve ad hoc
policy, expediency, or political results which are therefore low on the
scale of principled decisions. But McConnell himself is perhaps guilty
of a shell game himself. In his originalist zeal, he manipulates the canon
to include Congressional votes on desegregation type legislation.
McConnell also posits an implicit Congressional divesting of Supreme
Court jurisdiction on the basis of the clause empowering Congress to
implement the Fourteenth Amendment. He manipulates Congressional
silence in the District of Columbia to obtain a result which he argues
precludes segregation there. Based upon an unarticulated reliance on the
Fourteenth Amendment, finally McConnell contradicts himself by using
the forum of the forbidden Supreme Court for his Panel opinion, which
argues that only Congress and not the Court has jurisdiction.
1. What He Wrote Before
Professor Balkin’s invitation to Professor Michael McConnell was
understandable, because it served ecumenical objectives. McConnell
has written several articles justifying Brown’s desegregation holding on
conservative originalist grounds. 203 More credibility for the result in
Brown could be obtained because McConnell has vehemently attacked
the left-liberal, postmodernist jurisprudential world in which Balkin and
many of the other panelists have been known to reside.204 Balkin granted
exempting myself from this criticism, I’m saying that I see it as fundamental to developing a politics
of language that will be constructive as well as deconstructive.” FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 130, at 47. (One author of this article is not an illiterate female, and she does not understand
what that means.)
203. See generally Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995)
[hereinafter “Originalism”]; The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 457 (1996) [hereinafter “Originalist Case”] ; Segregation and the Original Understanding: A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233 (1996) [hereinafter “Maltz”]; The
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995)
[hereinafter “Klarman”].
204. See, e.g., The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment to Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997) [hereinafter
“Dworkin”]; The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 453 (2000) [hereinafter “Establishmentarianism”]; Brennan’s Approach to Reading and Interpreting the Constitution, 43
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 41 (1999) [hereinafter “Brennan”]; Michael J. Perry, The Role of Democratic
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this ideological opponent the honor of speaking second at the Panel, following only Balkin himself. For, it could be impressive that even the
conservative McConnell concurs in the panel opinion favoring Brown
desegregation, for reasons with which even the most traditional listener
might have to agree. The trouble is that McConnell who had criticized
others for “bait and switch,” played quite a few shell games to obtain the
traditionalist rules he offered as standards.
The bulk of McConnell’s writings have centered on a call for separation of powers, particularly judicial restraint, based on traditional (conservative) notions of the federalist and democratic governmental structure set forth by the Constitution’s founders. McConnell applauds
Justice Scalia’s “originalism, traditionalism, and restraint” approach to
judicial review, because all three methods reflect the will of the People,
“We the People,” if you will, not the will of the Supreme Court.205 Predictably Justice Brennan draws McConnell’s fire for his lack of positivism: “[Casting away all traditional constraints on decision-making places] into the hands of judges the power to turn their own views of good
social policy into law without any credible basis in constitutional text,
history, precedent, constitutional tradition, or contemporary democratic
warrant.” 206 In short, however, on the face of it, Brown v. Board of Education-type decisions would seemingly qualify with the other cases condemned by McConnell as examples in which the role of the judiciary has
been unconstitutionally wrent asunder. Why not?
Reciting the usual originalist litany, McConnell traces the judiciary’s proper function back to the Framers of the Constitution and their
original intent. McConnell tells us that the early Americans’ understanding of fundamental rights was directly influenced by England’s
Coke and Hale, who both disagreed with Hobbes’ view that law is noth-

Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) (book review)
[hereinafter “Perry”]; On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359 (1988) [hereinafter
“Reading”]; “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of Religion in the Post-modern
Age, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 163 (1993) [hereinafter “God is Dead”].
205. Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136-37
(1998) [hereinafter “Dead Hand”]. McConnell notes that he, and not Scalia, makes the connection
that these three approaches all reflect the will of the People. Id. at 1133. McConnell further notes
that Scalia does not specify when it is appropriate to use which approach. Id. “Traditionalism” as a
methodology is a term McConnell apparently claims to have coined: “[T]he Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the long-standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition
of the nation. I refer to this Constitutional methodology as ‘traditionalism’”. Id.
206. Brennan, supra note 204, at 58. McConnell adds that he was a clerk for Justice Brennan,
and that he is not being disloyal or unappreciative; McConnell notes that he and Brennan often used
to disagree, and Brennan appreciated their discourse. Id. at 57, 58.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 2
MACGRADY1.DOC

410

1/22/2021 3:50 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

ing more than the sovereign’s command. 207 To the founders, therefore,
the essence of constitutionalism was protection of rights, which were already long established, in the common law legal tradition, not rights attributable to legislative or furnished by parliamentary supremacy. 208
Thus, the government created by the Constitution was designed to preserve preexisting rights, not to create new rights.209 The role of the judiciary then is to protect rights, which the people have established for
themselves over time. Neglect of the authority of tradition, McConnell
tells us, “has produced a constitutional theory that is untrue to our constitutional heritage and unable to understand our constitutional practice.” 210 The court’s place was not originally, as it is not now, to judicially legislate.
Repeatedly, McConnell has also alerted his readers that there is
nothing special about judges that places them in an advantaged position
to prophesize. 211 McConnell has attacked the doctrine of unenumerated
rights, promulgated under the rubric of substantive due process, as
open-ended judicial review which threatens to undermine and cut short
the democratic process of “open-minded and public-spirited deliberation,” 212 presumably a reference to what occurs in the legislative branch.
Further, McConnell has informed his readers that Roe v. Wade’s
substantive due process methodology has indeed (finally) been ended:
Washington v. Glucksberg 213 held that federal courts have no authority
“to resolve contentious questions of social policy on the basis of their
own normative judgment.” 214 The Washington court declared that unenumerated due process rights must be based on the Constitutional text,

207. See Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 183-89 (1998). Coke, trying to remain within his religious tradition, argued that law came from the changeless “mists of time”. Id. at 184. His successor, Hale, argued
that law evolved from the changing and adopting of customs and traditions of the people. Id. at 188.
208. Id. at 190. The early Americans were not represented by Parliament, but by colonial assemblies, so they argued they were exempt from Parliamentary Supremacy. Id. at 190.
209. Id. at 196
210. Id. at 174-75
211. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 204, at 1534, “there is nothing unique about judges themselves that places them ‘in an institutionally advantaged position to play a prophetic role’.” (citation
omitted).
212. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89,108 (1988) [hereinafter “Moral Realist”]. The most commonly cited negative example of this doctrine is the Lochner period cases.
213. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that terminally ill adults do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the due process clause to have their physicians aid them in dying).
214. Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH
L. REV. 665, 666 (1997).
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in conjunction with the nation’s tradition and experience. 215 According
to McConnell, Washington’s significance rests predominantly in its restoration of the proper balance of power between courts and the legislature under the Fourteenth Amendment. 216
McConnell elsewhere infers that rebalancing was much needed, because “[t]he appearance of debate and deliberation created by the [court]
opinions is largely a sham.” 217 The judiciary’s analysis, McConnell enlightens us, particularly that of the Supreme Court, is “typically long on
manipulation of precedent and low on intelligible principle.” 218 “All the
apparatus of Supreme Court opinions is designed to create the appearance that the Justices are following the law, not making it up.” 219 It is
only in Constitutional law, McConnell observes, that people want to
“give up on the enterprise as impossible” if the Constitution is unclear. 220 In other words, by giving up on the enterprise, McConnell
means moving from some form of originalism to a policy or a political
morality interpretive stance (e.g. Dworkin). McConnell analogizes: No
one would be willing to say that judges can write contracts out of the law
just because they are unclearly written. They can write clauses based on
the parties’ probable intent. Since judges cannot write new terms into
contracts without probable intent, why, McConnell asks, is judicial rewriting often readily accepted when it comes to the Constitution? 221
Here McConnell suggests that jurists take the stance to produce a particular outcome. 222
The particular outcome that troubles McConnell may be more
clearly understood by what McConnell calls establishmentarianism. Establishmentarianism is what liberalism strives to break away from. It is
215. See id.
216. See id at 665-66, 708 (probably the most important case in last twenty years on unenumerated rights). McConnell infers that the magnitude of the Washington decision is as earthshaking as Lochner, Brown, and Roe were. See id.
217. Perry, supra note 204, at 1537.
218. See id. (referring to the Court’s decisions in “affirmative action, parochial school aid,
children’s rights, educational funding, capital punishment, pornography, property rights, and others.”).
219. Dead Hand, supra note 205, at 1129.
220. Reading, supra note 204, at 361.
221. See id. But McConnell’s premise is wrong. Judges rewrite contracts all the time for policy reasons, implying this provision and that, not to mention use of the objective theory of contracts
to do what they want.
222. McConnell has not inferred that it is only liberal judges who seek substantive outcomes
regardless of constitutional precedent: “For most people most of the time, issues of federalism take
second seat to particular substantive outcomes” (quote made with reference to Rehnquist’s upholding of the drinking age of 21). See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’
Design’ 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1488 (1987) (book review) [hereinafter Evaluating].
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“[t]he idea that a nation should be animated by a set of common values
and beliefs, backed by governmental authority.” 223 Liberalism, on the
other hand, champions varied and individual political, religious, and
moral associations. In liberal states, such as the United States, it is theoretically difficult or impossible for the state to engage in the promotion
of public virtues without compromising its commitment to neutrality.
The private sector, therefore, is the principle inculcator of individual as
well as public values. 224
Theoretically. McConnell has thus offered a theory that our liberal
state is not so liberal after all because it offers a set of “politically correct
values.” He argues that establishmentarianism has insinuated its way into our society, and has recently surfaced with a “new” set of values. Establishmentarianism makes its way into a liberal society not on the ancient traditional ground that it is for the spiritual good of the people, but
on the political ground that “certain common values are necessary to the
unity and republican character of the state.” 225
This search for common values, McConnell posits, is likely only an
“excuse for imposition of majoritarian norms.” The initial era of establishmentarianism reared its head during the height of immigration, when
“nativists, anti-Catholics, and common school reformers” united in the
formation of public schools, which were designed to inculcate
“Protestant, capitalist, and patriotic virtue.” 226 Recently, the new establishmentarianism, McConnell explains, has manifested under the guise
of “pluralism, diversity, and tolerance.” This time, however, the extolled public virtues are not Protestantism, capitalism, and patriotism,
but rather the “eradication of racism, sexism, and heterosexism,” 227 and
the encouragement of environmentalism, safe sex, and a critical attitude
towards global Westernization. 228 But McConnell advises us that we are
being misled, because the new establishmentarianism is no less hostile
towards pluralism, diversity, and tolerance than the prior era was, 229 in
223. Establishmentarianism, supra note 204, at 453. McConnell notes that establishmentarianism comes in both religious and secular varieties; it is but need not be associated with persecution, for sanctions can range from highly coercive to tolerant, for not adhering to the views backed
by the polis. Id. at 453-54.
224. See id. at 455.
225. Id. at 458 (Reference to Benjamin Rush’s reasoning for public schools and their curriculums.)
226. Id. at 458-59 (containing the above quotes).
227. Id. at 461-62 (supporting this and previous quote).
228. God is Dead, supra note 204, at 179 (explaining that education today is used to promulgate a new set of values).
229. Establishmentarianism, supra note 204, at 461-62. An example McConnell provides is
the cases involving Chicago and Yale law schools, which would not allow the Christian Legal Soci-
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that it allows little tolerance for those who do not join the “politically
correct.” When citizens are coerced230 into displaying majoritarian beliefs, McConnell warns, liberalism is, for all intents and purposes,
smothered.
McConnell blames the postmodernists, attacking them as hypocrites. McConnell reminds us that the postmodernists have taught that
liberalism’s purported neutrality is really only a cover-up for centuries of
“patriarchal, white, male, European, and bourgeois interests and values,”
and that objectivity is therefore a mirage since our perception and the
perception of those who established those values, were clouded by our
individual perspectives. 231 The postmodernists invariably select their
favorite (political) topic; it may be racism, feminism, environmentalism,
welfare, etc. The postmodernists then call on their secular ideologies
and “use political muscle to advance their causes, including using the
public schools to inculcate their ideals.” 232
McConnell may be arguing, indirectly, that postmodernists back
more expansive roles for the judiciary in constitutional cases, because
that is one of the most efficient ways to advance their ideological goals.
For example, McConnell attacks Ronald Dworkin for advocating that
judges should read the Constitution based on their “own views about political morality” rather than “purporting” to decide cases based on “tradition” or “constitutional structure.” 233 The idea of judges substituting
their own conceptions of what is best for those of representative bodies
is, McConnell has repeatedly informed us, the antithesis of what the
founding statesmen understood constitutional rights to mean. 234 In any
event, McConnell finds that this violates the heart of a democratic society. “Judges act legitimately under the Constitution only when they are

ety to utilize the job placement offices because the Society only hires students who share in the
groups’ religious beliefs. Id. at 464-65. Chicago and Yale banned the Society on grounds of discrimination. Id. Though federal civil rights laws exempt religious organizations from religious antidiscrimination laws, see Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987), and Chicago and
Yale as private organizations are not obliged to abide by the First Amendment, McConnell asks
why these schools do not do so anyway. Id. at 464-65
230. The coercion often is “gentle”, such as through taxation and selective funding. Id. at 468
231. God is Dead, supra note 204, at 182. See also Perry, supra note 202, at 1506.: “Perry’s
insistence on self-critical rationality contradicts his own position that ‘[t]here is no evaluative perspective outside self or tradition’.” Id.
232. God is Dead, supra note 204 at 188.
233. Dworkin, supra note 204, at 1272-73 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3-4 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)). Actually
Dworkin denies that his judges should decide on the basis of their own political morality, and
McConnell recognizes this. Id. at 1272.
234. See id. at 1272-73, 1287.
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faithfully enforcing [collective decisions of the people]. To enforce
something else (on the claim that it would do more ‘credit to the nation’)
separates the text from the source of its authority.” 235 Thus, McConnell
considers Dworkin and those in his camp to be laboring under false
premises. Dworkin and his acolytes maintain that judges decide “fairly
and wisely,” when in actuality, “all judges fall short of the judicial ideal”
due to bias, unintelligence, or the difficulty of transcending one’s own
interests and values. 236
It is not clear to us why Brown would not fall into that category.
McConnell attacks the Court’s ability to engage in meaningful moral deliberation because of class bias, and lack of time to read and deliberate. 237 He holds that “representative bodies are institutionally better able
to reach solutions to contentious issues of this sort. . . .” 238 So losers feel
they have had their say; and an “unprincipled” compromise [quotes are
McConnell’s] can be adopted. When judges are unsure whether a governmental action is unconstitutional, they should leave the determination
to elected bodies, and not make their own opinions law. 239
He also attacks Professor Michael Perry’s approach. McConnell
further elaborates his views in his book review of Professor Michael Perry’s book Morality, Politics and Law. Professor McConnell, criticizing
Perry’s approach, says: it is my experience and conviction that “the Constitution is an elegant and profound statement of a highly attractive conception of government.” 240 He rejects the idea that the Constitution is “a
mishmash of political compromises or a congeries of inscrutable
phrases.” 241
McConnell does distance himself from a positivistic originalism,
however. 242 He criticizes Perry’s theory for being too open ended and
doubts Perry’s claim that his theory has sufficiently circumscribed limits. 243 McConnell is disturbed that Perry seems to allow judges to pick
and choose among Constitutional principles based on their own politicalmoral preconceptions and reject those they do not like. 244

235. Id. at 1278 n.45.
236. Id. at 1291.
237. Perry, supra note 204, at 1537 (most judges reflect a bias in favor of upper middle class).
238. Id. at 1540.
239. Reading, supra note 204, at 361.
240. Perry, supra note 204, at 1525.
241. Id. at 1525. This could be a slap at Professor Balkin.
242. Id. (the discretion element remains).
243. Id. at 1526 (Perry’s approach is problematic).
244. Id. at 1529 (criticizing Perry for providing no examples of how his theory might work in
practice).
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It is not that the Constitution prevents social change; it only slows it
down to ensure that change is made by the people. “[T]he originalist
method leaves ample scope for judgment and disagreement.” 245 Even
when attitudes are in the midst of change, courts should not “prematurely” resolve issues or “accelerate the pace of change.” The several states
are laboratories of democracy, and through experimentation, the people
will find the appropriate solution to problems. 246 McConnell is even
willing to allow that sometimes community decisions will be wrong; that
wrong is better than the “risk posed by alternatives”——namely, judicial
legislation——which “are worse.” 247
It is interesting (and ironic) that with that background, McConnell
has been able simultaneously to defend the Brown v. Board of Education
decision on originalist grounds. The majority scholarly opinion has been
that the Ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to outlaw
segregation, and hence, Brown did not follow the Ratifiers’ intent.248
McConnell has maintained that the majority is wrong. To elaborate this
argument, McConnell argues that the Reconstruction Amendments were
the “extension” 249 or “culmination” 250 of the “fundamental principles of
the Founding” which “because of slavery, had never been fully
achieved.” 251 (May one then assume by analogy that the founders’ sexism did not obstruct “culmination of fundamental principles of founding,
leading to a society without gender bias?”)
245. Id. at 1533, 1535.
246. Right to Die, supra note 214, at 687.
247. Moral Realist, supra note 212, at 90. “Perhaps most importantly, judges are irresponsible
in the most fundamental sense: they are not accountable for the consequences of their decisions and
ordinarily are not even aware of them.” Id. at 106. So is McConnell suggesting that Justice Brennan, for whom McConnell clerked, did not, or was it could not understand the ramifications of his
decisions. Is the same true of Justice Rehnquist? “Power without responsibility is not a happy combination.” Id.
248. The majority of scholars believe that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment didn’t
intend to outlaw segregation because “[t]he evidence is ‘obvious’ and ‘[un]ambiguous’, the conclusion is ‘inevitable’ and ‘inescapable’ and ‘[v]irtually nothing’ supports the opposite claim, which is
said to be ‘fanciful’. Originalism, supra note 203, at 951. Of course, the majority of scholars do
not ultimately hold that against the validity of the holding. McConnell’s central article on this subject, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, “relied heavily” on prior work done by Maltz.
Maltz disagrees with McConnell and contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid segregation on its face, and does not, by its original understanding, support Brown’s holding. Maltz,
supra note 203, at 233.
249. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
115, 142 n.93 (1994) [hereinafter “Moment”].
250. Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or
the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1992) [hereinafter
“The Fourteenth Amendment”].
251. Moment, supra note 249, at 142 n.93.
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McConnell supports his argument with proof founded on legislative
activity during the Reconstruction period. He concedes that the legislative history surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is
unhelpful as to whether it intended to maintain or abrogate segregation. 252 Despite his concession that the “principle purpose” of the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and that the 1866 Act was not understood to forbid school segregation,
McConnell nonetheless maintains that the Fourteenth Amendment, being
“more” than the 1866 Act, does not necessarily have the same intention
regarding segregation. 253 Although he further admits that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not about granting blacks social equality, McConnell
avers that the legislative history from 1868-1875, the “best available evidence,” points to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment did intend to eradicate school segregation. 254
First, McConnell points to proposed House and Senate bills during
the early 1870’s which by majority votes (over 50%) would have outlawed segregation in schools, common carriers and other institutions, but
were unable to meet the required two-thirds override due in part to democratic filibusters. The “Sumner-Butler bill” on desegregation was ultimately passed in 1874, after it had been watered-down and the school
desegregation part had been removed. The watered-down provisions became the Civil Rights Act of 1875. McConnell concludes that because
those legislators who voted on the desegregation bills were the same as
those who supported the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and because those votes constituted a majority of the total votes, the mainstream view during Reconstruction was that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires desegregation. 255
Second, McConnell points to an 1873 case in which the Supreme
Court, interpreting an 1863 Congressional law, unanimously held that a
“nondiscrimination” requirement meant no segregation because segregation is inherently unequal. 256 Even though this was not a Fourteenth
Amendment case, but a statutory interpretation case, McConnell stresses
the Court’s language regarding the railroad company’s separate-but-equal argument: “an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance

252. Originalism, supra note 203, at 984.
253. Id. at 960-62.
254. Id. at 1017, 984.
255. See generally id. at 1060, 1105.
256. Id. at 1117 (discussing Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873)); See also
Originalist Case, supra note 203, at 457-58.
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with the obvious meaning of the requirement.” 257 This is apparently
proof of “mainstream” views on segregation.
However, as McConnell himself points out, the Reconstruction
agenda diffused. 258 The Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877 gave the
southern states back their autonomy from the federal government as long
as the states promised to protect blacks’ rights. 259 In 1883, the Supreme
Court invalidated the 1875 Civil Rights Act as unconstitutional, because
“it constituted ‘direct and primary’ legislation of private conduct, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment refers to the state provision of equal protection of the law.” 260 In 1896, the Supreme Court handed down Plessy
v. Ferguson, which, according to McConnell, “marked the effective repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 261
Now comes the muddying of the waters. The manner by which
McConnell deals with the diffusion of the Reconstruction period’s enactments and ideals bears perhaps a little too close resemblance to what
McConnell calls the “bait-and switch” game, of which he has accused
his left of center foes. 262 That is, McConnell appears to be operating selectively so as to use that which favors his desired outcome, disregarding
the history, legislation, and cases which he finds unhelpful or simply
“wrong.”
There is tension between his two positions. First, the contention is
that courts should, on the one hand, follow the example of the original
founders and defer to the will of the people (traditionalism) rather than
creating new law. On the other hand, his assertion is that the original
Constitution was not even “fulfilled” until the Fourteenth Amendment. 263 By that reasoning, one may deduce that: 1) The original found257. Originalism, supra note 203, at 1118 (citing Brown, 84 U.S. at 452).
258. McConnell contends that Bruce Ackerman’s theory that there were three “constitutional
moments” which created our constitutional rules (the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal)
is incomplete: There was also the “forgotten” moment when Reconstruction ended. McConnell
illustrates in The Forgotten Constitutional Moment that according to Ackerman’s criteria for what
can constitute a “moment”, the end of reconstruction fits. McConnell, however, criticises Ackerman’s theory that only at particular “moments” our constitutional tradition was created. See Moment, supra note 249, at 140-44.
259. Thereafter, of course, the southern states did not quite live up to the standards the Union
had wanted. One example is the segregation laws which started to be passed in the 1880’s. Id. at
132.
260. Id. at 137 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
261. Id. at 140 (effective repeal of Fourteenth Amendment).
262. See, e.g., Reading, supra note 224, at 360: “Judicial review is not an intergenerational
game of bait-and switch”. See alsoMcConnell, supra note 95, infra 155, where he accuses other
panelists, particularly Ackerman of this ignoble practice.
263. While McConnell has used the term “extension”, see, e.g., Moment, supra note 249, at
142 n.93, to describe the Reconstruction Amendments (which includes the Fourteenth, he has also
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ers did not actually follow the will of the people, since their Constitution
was unable to be “fulfilled” due to slavery (this reminds us of what Balkin said about the Constitution being a compromise 264); or, 2) Only the
Madisonian founders (who urged a federal veto over state laws to protect
rights 265) had it “right,” and the Constitution up to the Reconstruction
was in a sense “wrong” or at least incomplete. This would imply that a
priori there are intrinsically (moral) “right and wrong” answers; or, 3)
The original Constitution did reflect the will of the people (who did not
want a powerful federal government), but that the people were “wrong”
because the Constitution could not be “fulfilled” until there was a federal
veto over state laws; or, 4) Sometimes it is alright to break traditionalist
rules when something such as slavery is at issue.
McConnell appears to especially favor number four. 266 He has
written that “[s]ome issues are so fundamental to basic justice that they
must be taken out of majoritarian control altogether.” 267 This is because
democracy itself cannot be trusted with some matters. 268 He may be arguing that the view at the founding regarding state versus federal power
was “much more divided and ambivalent” than today (after Brown).
For today the federal government is understood “to be our system’s primary protector of individual liberties.” 269 However, this leaves us wondering if “We the People” changed our minds about the role of the federal government, or did someone decide to take things out of our
majoritarian control and insinuate some establishmentarianism into the
system?
Perhaps the tension can be answered by focusing on McConnell’s
moral realism: “I am . . . a moral realist: one who believes in rights as in
some sense real or natural, not just conventional; rights as connected in
some way with what our most reflective and dedicated thinking proposes
about the truth concerning simple justice or human nature.’” 270
stated that the Fourteenth was the “culmination”, see, e.g., The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note
250, at 1160, and “fulfillment” of the Madisonian Constitution which could not pass in 1787, see,
e.g., id. at 1167.
264. McConnell expressly has rejected the idea that the Constitution is “a mishmash of political compromises or a congeries of inscrutable phrases,” Perry, supra note 204, at 1525.
265. See generally The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 250, at 1165-66 (Madison urged a
federal veto over state law).
266. Though one could probably draw the conclusion that he agrees with any one of the above
deductions.
267. Evaluating, supra note 222, at 1506 (giving as an example that both state and federal
governments cannot pass ex post facto laws and bills of attainder).
268. Id. at 1507.
269. Id. at 1501.
270. Moral Realist, supra note 212, at 90 (reacting to and quoting Sotirios Barber, The Ninth

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/2

48

MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
MACGRADY1.DOC

2002]

1/22/2021 3:50 PM

ANOTHER COUNCIL OF NICAEA?

419

McConnell has told us repeatedly that his moral realism does not allow
judicially enforceable unenumerated rights.271 He has also told us that
democracy itself cannot be trusted with some issues. So then, if in some
matters the federal lawmakers, the state lawmakers, and the judiciary
cannot be trusted, what is left to turn to? The executive? Unlikely.
McConnell must mean that the Constitution itself holds the answers. He has, after all, stated quite clearly that some court opinions upheld laws, which were “unconstitutional” (such as Plessy and Minersville) while other courts struck down laws that were “constitutional”
(such as Dred Scott and Lochner). 272 The Plessy court, for example, was
apparently incorrect in claiming to base its decision on “established usages, customs and traditions of the people” when the Jim Crow laws
were only “of very recent vintage” because tradition, apparently, is not
always enough. 273 And in any case, discrimination is one of those exceptions in which the Constitution holds the key but “We the People”
got it wrong.
Some of the people. Others, apparently, had it “right.” McConnell
applauds the Reconstruction period as an era when majoritarian opinion
was stamped unconstitutional. Put another way, minority opinions were
constitutionalized. For instance, the Fifteenth Amendment gave blacks
the right to vote, when the majority opposed it. 274 “This was a time
when a political minority, armed with the prestige of victory in the Civil
War and with military control over the political apparatus of the rebel
states, imposed constitutional change on the Nation as the price of reunion, with little regard for popular opinion.” 275 The Reconstruction period and its goals is an exception to the traditionalism and “no judicial legislation” rules because the judiciary should engage in political morality
to support a desired outcome, even if that outcome does stem from a minorities’ opinion.
So, sometimes McConnell attacks court opinions for “making” law
rather than following traditionalism. However, on occasion, he embraces court opinions, like Brown, for “getting it right.” On the other hand,
Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 70 (1988)).
271. See, e.g., id.
272. See Right to Die, supra note 214, at 688-89 .
273. Originalism, supra note 203, at 984 (citation omitted).
274. Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939. McConnell used this example to refute today’s majoritarian opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to eradicate segregation just because segregation was popular when it was ratified; the Fifteenth clearly gave blacks the right to
vote despite tradition of the time. Of course, by 1900 the Fifteenth Amendment was also a “dead
letter”, see Moment, supra note 249, at 131
275. Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939.
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judges should not follow their own political morality because that violates federalism, democracy, and the founders’ intent. However, in the
exception cases, judges should side with the political minorities and take
control into their own hands, even if it means abandoning the federalist
system and majority opinion. Sometimes it is all right to rewrite the federalist system, 276 because sometimes the Constitution holds the keys
which, apparently, have been misplaced, and because sometimes the
Constitution is “unfulfilled.” Because it can also happen that some people had it “right” (like Madison) while others (like the people) had it
“wrong.” In the final analysis, is McConnell not just insinuating his
own brand of “establishmentarianism” into the system?
2. And What He Says Now
Unlike other Panelists, McConnell’s panel opinion itself does not
so much stand in stark contrast to what he has written prior to it, because
it is little more than a summary of his previous articles on the subject. A
major problem is that McConnell gave a court-type legal decision in the
first place - particularly one which concurs with the majority. A second
problem is that McConnell engages in the kind of selectivity of sources
of law with an eye on outcome, which he criticizes others for doing.
There seems also to be a tension between McConnell’s position on
Brown and Bolling. In his analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe, McConnell
maintains that Congress intended to divest the Court of power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment and reserve the power of primary enforcer
for Congress, because Congress was not pleased with the Court’s history
(i.e., Dred Scott). If Congress intended to divest the Court of power to
decide cases seeking enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment issues, is it
not inconsistent then for the Court to decide Brown at all on the basis of
the intent of Congress? Should McConnell not be writing a dissenting
opinion which states that the Court has no jurisdiction here? 277
Other problems arise. We may recall that the purpose of the Panel
was to rewrite Brown, knowing what you do about the course of history.
Now recall that McConnell has previously told us that in 1997, the
Washington Court cleaned up the substantive due process/unenumerated
rights problem created by Roe in 1973. Therefore, we now know that
judges cannot make decisions based on their own political morality.
276. Such as what the Fourteenth Amendment did, giving the federal government what had
been in the states’ hands for over a hundred years.
277. Maybe he could have said that, alas, jurisdiction existed to decide that there was no proper jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction to decide the case had been granted improvidently.
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Judges must defer to traditionalist factors. Was McConnell keeping that
important lesson of history in mind when rewriting Brown?
McConnell finds the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which
the Brown Court found incorporated equal protection, irrelevant to the
District of Columbia. McConnell might distinguish Bolling, saying that
unlike Brown, Bolling is not a constitutional question, but one of a statutory interpretation. That is, the school boards in the District of Columbia
lacked statutory authority to segregate because Congress has never
passed any law authorizing or requiring segregation. Unless Congress
explicitly says so, “federal agencies [cannot] depart from general principles of equal protection of the laws.” 278 However, seemingly in contradiction, McConnell has admitted that the Court is viewing it as a Fourteenth Amendment issue by bringing in the “equal protection of the
laws” issue in his Panel opinion. 279 McConnell also holds in his opinion
that the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Privileges and Immunities
Clause “prohibit de jure segregation of schools.” McConnell can get no
help from the intent of the Framers. For, McConnell’s opinion then argues that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was passed upon the assurance that the political rights of all citizens were not protected. 280
McConnell is a little less clear on the intent of the Citizenship Clause,
stating that there is virtually no discussion by the Framers of the Citizenship Clause.
But there is an even larger problem than McConnell claiming Bolling is not a Constitutional question when in reality he is treating it as
one. If the Fourteenth Amendment gave enforcement powers to Congress, and not to the Court, then what is wrong with Congress’s decision
not to prohibit segregation? Does it not follow that, because Congress
failed to prohibit segregation, it therefore intended to allow segregation?
McConnell goes on to explain we should “avoid anomalous conflicts”
between citizens within the state and federal spheres. This sounds like
the “unthinkable” argument in reverse for which McConnell attacked
another Panelist. What the Panel has done is strip Congress of powers,
just like the Court did in Dred Scott. Just like it is not supposed to be
doing, or, at least like McConnell says it is not supposed to be doing.
There must be something out there that prevents this. Could it be the
Fourteenth Amendment?
278. See McConnell, supra note 95.
279. See id.
280. But see Michaelman and Ackerman arguing that this fact, if true, is irrelevant. They assert
that there are national rights of citizenship including desegregated education to be derived from
these provisions. See supra note 13.
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McConnell takes refuge in humility. Playing a Supreme Court Justice, McConnell attempts to portray humility, stating at the beginning of
his opinion that this Court has no more foresight than past courts which
made immoral decisions, and accordingly been “deknighted.” He tells
us that the Court can only “enforce rules imposed by others” and interpret the Constitution, which is written in “understandable English” with
“discernible purposes.” But, of course, not all precedent must be followed, since some courts and its decisions have been deknighted. So we
must ignore such cases as Dred Scott, which read the Constitution “fancifully,” Plessy, which “turned its back on the original promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” and Slaughterhouse, which had a “dubious interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Yes, it is “impossible to tell” whether the language of the Fourteenth Amendment [written, recall, in understandable English with discernible purposes] required
segregation. But McConnell is quite confident in saying that “segregation is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
McConnell states that he is only reminding us of the deknighted
former courts in order to warn against hubris. He wants to exhibit the
unconstitutional and immoral wrongs, which can be and unfortunately
have been committed when the Supreme Court grants itself too much
power to judicially legislate. He apparently wants to reassure us that this
Court (or at least himself) is doing everything possible to avoid such calamities from reoccurring, because after all, this Court recognizes hubris.
Should we be as confident that McConnell has eliminated hubris
when he announces that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits de jure segregation of schools” despite Slaughterhouse and the fact that no court has relied on the clause
for this purpose since then? Can we rest easily when he states that the
Sumner-Butler bill votes enact the “mainstream view” of the Reconstruction period against the constitutionality of school segregation, notwithstanding a declaration that the Reconstruction party itself was a minority? 281 Is everyone comfortable with McConnell’s presumption that
the minority Reconstruction party was “right” even though its efforts
were relatively quickly diffused? Can we easily ignore the opinion of
the people throughout centuries and their representative legislative bodies, especially those in the South, because they were “wrong,” and the
democratic process cannot be trusted in some circumstances?282 If we
281. Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939.
282. Recall that one of the biggest problems with Dworkin and his followers is that Dworkin
allowed judges to decide what is right for the nation and utterly disregard the fact that the legislature
speaking in majority cloak had passed laws to the contrary. Dworkin, supra note 204, at 1273.
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can do that in these circumstances, why not do it in others? Is there really no problem with allowing the Court to place the decision-making
power on that issue of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment upon itself
even though Section 5 of the Amendment grants that power to Congress? To “bait-and-switch” is prohibited, but is it acceptable to choose
which parts of history one likes, even if it is a “minority” Reconstruction
party which “We the People” decided to diffuse? And is there no hubris
in bringing back to life in the year 1954 an Amendment, which was “effectively repealed” in 1896? 283
McConnell apparently thinks not. On the other hand, there is a rather uncanny resemblance to “selective postmodernism” and its entanglements with establishmentarianism. Is it not selectivity run rampant,
and the use of state power to do the forbidden establishmentarianism that
is all right if he is doing the “establishing?” Would it not be better if
McConnell simply listened to his own advice and “resigned” from the
Court?
McConnell was borrowing from Legal Realism when he accused
the Court of manipulation to delegitimate the role of the Supreme Court
in the legal process. This was the essence of his heated exchange with
Ackerman. McConnell preferred to do his own manipulation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring it the exclusive province of Congress.
Having done that, he preferred to manipulate the importance of Congressional silence by analogy to some Commerce Clause rhetoric. Sometimes where Congress is silent on Commerce Clause issues the states
may not act because Congressional silence precludes state action.
Does he take all this seriously? When Professor McConnell was
confronted with the challenge that his position isolated him on the Panel,
he chuckled and said there had to be some controversy on the Panel. In
the question session, McConnell critiqued Ackerman’s presentation by
pointing out that the Supreme Court could not just send out a decree and
expect everyone to salute. The legal process required a process of reasoned elaboration that was not bait-and-switch.
McConnell objected strenuously to Ackerman’s use of the Privileges and Immunity Clause and the Citizenship Clause in his argument.
The essence was that it was manipulation, for the Court and its academic
apologists could not say that Brown was about education one day, and
that it was about public golf courses and swimming pools the next. He
also found it reprehensible to hold that Brown was based on the citizenship right of American nationals because of the Citizenship Clause on
283.

Moment, supra note 249, at 140.
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Monday, and on Tuesday, Brown meant that immigrants had a right to
an education, even though they were not citizens. Ackerman was visibly
disturbed at McConnell’s attack. Ackerman believed what he was doing
was in line with precedent and McConnell was wrong to question this.
What McConnell is offering is a cry for limiting the Court in favor of the
decrees of Congress and other elected bodies or so he may like to be
heard.
The problem is that McConnell has manipulated the canon, introducing a loose cannon on the deck. That loose cannon is the reference to
selected legislative acts (e.g., Sumner-Butler) and selected legislative
behavior (e.g., votes on segregation of transportation). He has not successfully explained away the significance of the diffusion of the Reconstructionist program after the Hayes-Tilden Compromise in his argument
about the “forgotten Constitutional moment.” Problems in his analysis
continue when he finds that Congress meant to reserve jurisdiction for
itself in racial matters, because he then plays a Supreme Court Justice
and writes an opinion exercising the very jurisdiction that he said was
reserved for the legislature. Finally, he accuses others of manipulation,
but does a fine job himself of injecting his moralism into the Brown
opinion after criticizing others for making moral judgments in the form
of law.
D. Professor John Ely
Professor Ely displays abiding contradiction because he attacks the
Court for substantive due process type arguments, while affirming the
Brown opinion. This is mind-boggling. He has the audacity to argue for
a process-oriented jurisprudence based on allowing access to minorities
to the legislative and executive process, attack a morally based “substantive” Court decision process, and at the same time affirm Brown because
separate is not equal! As if this is not enough for a good day’s work, Ely
trashes the legislative and executive branches’ failure to live up to separation of powers dictates. This might be all in a day’s work, except he
restricts the Supreme Court to process decisions, meaning the legislature
gets deference, which Ely argues it does not deserve because legislatures
are not concerned with policy, only re-election.
As a self-proclaimed moderate, 284 advocate of “activist” legal pro-

284. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 475 n.16 (1996) [hereinafter ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND], “Of course I confess to being a moderate myself. . . .” (This book is
cited with some hesitancy, since Ely specifically requested it be cited, id. at 363.)
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cess, 285 and a long-standing fan of the Warren Court, 286 Professor John
Hart Ely fit well as an ecumenical panelist. Ely was given the honor of
speaking last at the Brown panel. As “batting clean-up,” 287 his speech
was short, but not necessarily sweet. He may have been well-advised to
have chosen those relatively few words more carefully. His Panel argument not only did not internally support itself, but it lacked support from
what he had previously written.
In summary, Professor Ely presents a puzzling analysis which: 1)
attacks Congress for having abdicated its role as a policy-maker but at
the same time affirms it as better suited than the Supreme Court to decide policy matters; 2) advocates a process approach which stresses the
access of discrete and insular minorities to voting rights and similar access problems; 3) at the same time attacks the Court for Lochner-type
substantive due process value judgments; 4) despite 2 and 3 manages to
affirm Brown, which is clearly not an access to the political process
case! Ely attacks Brown’s sociological footnote in his writings, but decides ex cathedra that it was correct in its finding of inherent harm in his
Panel opinion. So, Ely managed a difficult feat in affirming Brown. 288
1. What He Wrote Before
According to Ely’s argument, essentially one of separation of powers, the Constitution’s overwhelming purpose was to outline governmental procedure and to ensure citizens’ access to it and not to select substantive values. 289 Substantive values are the jurisdiction of the
285. See, e.g., id. at 361.
286. Aside from the fact that Ely clerked for Warren, Ely has also applauded the Warren Court
for its approach to the democratic process: “Other Courts had recognized the connection between . . . political activity and the proper functioning of the democratic process; the Warren Court
was the first seriously to act upon it.” John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode
of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 452-3 (1978).
287. See Ely, supra note 26.
288. Ely may have anticipated problems in his approach. Having clerked for Justice Warren,
he is able to quote an oral statement of Warren: if Reynolds v. Sims had been decided before Brown,
Brown would have been unnecessary. See The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974). Ely wanted
to argue that process and access are the key, and substantive rights are not the proper object of the
Court’s concern. Unfortunately for Ely, this gets him nowhere in affirming the substantive rights
decision in Brown.
289. Ely maintains that the original Constitution’s substantive provisions are few, and protect
only very limited values: corruption of blood is forbidden (one cannot be punished for one’s parents’ transgressions), the federal and state governments cannot tax exported articles, and slavery
was protected at least up to 1808. Ely maintains that the Bill of Rights is about separation of powers, not substantive rights. The Eighteenth Amendment did add temperance, but was repealed by
the Twenty-first Amendment—another example that substantive values just don’t work in the Constitution. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 92-101 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) [here-
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legislative and executive branches—the political process. 290 Therefore,
“preserving fundamental values is not an appropriate constitutional
task.” 291 The courts’ job is to actively enforce “every clause in the Constitution,” but not to enforce clauses absent from it, regardless of the apparent distaste for the legislation in question.292 Though some critical
Constitutional phrases need external sources to be given shape, 293 openended clauses are not blank checks for courts; otherwise, as Ely wrote,
“we might as well stop pretending we are in any significant respect a
democracy.” 294 The backbone of this separation of powers structure is
the evasion of power accumulation in one governmental branch 295—
which would be the tyranny that the Framers’ were escaping through the
Declaration of Independence from England. When it comes to separation of powers, there can be no adverse possession arguments. 296
So courts, as laid out under Article III’s cases and controversies requirement, cannot create broad rules. Courts may only apply Constitutional or statutory law. 297 The important exception is when it comes to
the protection of minorities—or, as Carolene Products footnote 4 puts it,
“discrete and insular minorities.” 298 In other words, courts may step in
and undo legislation (substantive values) that in some way discriminate
against those who are politically powerless. The reason for this excepinafter DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. See also DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 291, where it is pointed
out that so-called process rights involve substantive value choices.
290. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 87:
“contrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as ‘an enduring but evolving statement
of general values’, is that in fact the selection and accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process and instead the document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the
one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes . . . and on the other . . .
with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.”
291. Id. at 88.
292. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 280.
293. John Hart Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, in The Supreme Court
1977 Term 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5 (1978) [hereinafter “Fundamental Values”].
294. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 297.
295. “We would do well to heed [the framers’] warning that, in calm and anxious ages alike,
the ‘accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.” Id. at 135 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)).
296. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A War Powers Act that Worked 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1379, 1390-91 (1988) [hereinafter “War Powers Act”].
297. See, e.g., ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 122, “Roughly, Article III, by
limiting federal courts to cases and controversies, tells them, at least in theory, two things. First,
they—unlike the legislature—may not create broad rules; they must content themselves with applying the law, either statutory or constitutional, to the particular disputes before them. And second,
because they are restricted to adjudicating the rights of litigants before them, they can act only retrospectively.”
298. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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tion, Ely informs us, is that the Constitution and our forbearers considered equality very important (leaving slavery aside). 299 Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause operate as
equality provisions, “guaranteeing virtual representation to the politically powerless.” 300 And of course there is the Equal Protection Clause, but
that was not intended to be about specific applications, either; it was a
general rule to be worked out by posterity. 301
Ely has maintained that Carolene Products’ footnote 4 foreshadowed the Warren Court. 302 The Warren Court was concerned with ensuring that all have access to the political process and correcting certain
forms of discrimination, not with vindicating any particular substantive
values. 303 Ely tells us that Warren allegedly once said, “A concern with
process, seriously pursued, can lead in some quite ‘activist’ directions.” 304 The hallmark ruling being, of course, Brown.
The logic starts becoming fuzzy at this point. Ely has written that
the Equal Protection Clause “is largely to protect against substantive outrages by requiring that those who would harm others must at the same
time harm themselves.” 305 The Fourteenth Amendment’s central concern was eradicating prejudicial thinking which creates “racial classifications that disadvantage minorities.” 306 Yet none of these descriptions of
Equal Protection a priori mandate school segregation’s illegitimacy or
unconstitutionality. Desegregation may have hurt blacks by giving them
insecurities in that environment, but experts on the side of antidesegregation in Brown had good credentials and intentions, too. 307 But
let’s consider Ely’s views a little further. Ely has long been clear that he
299. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 79, 122 (“many among the
framers stressed the importance to the system they were forging of the equal representation of equal
population groups.” Interestingly, Ely does not leave aside our forbearers’ sexism).
300. Id. at 90-91.
301. “[T]he overriding intention of those who wrote and ratified the Equal Protection Clause
was apparently to state a general ideal whose specific applications would be supplied by posterity.
They surely entertained no specific intention that the Equal Protection Clause would cover antimicegenation laws, or for that matter segregated schooling either.” Id. at 119.
302. See, e.g., id. at 75. See also Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 5-6. “Generally
speaking, the Warren Court was a Carolene Products Court, centrally concerned with assuring
broad participation, not simply in the processes of government but in the benefits generated by those
processes as well.”
303. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 74.
304. See, e.g., Ely, 88 HARV. L. REV. at 12.
305. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 170.
306. Id. at 137, n.11 (citing Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
307. John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 216
(1998) [hereinafter “Loving”].
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does not believe in substantive due process. 308 The Constitution is not
and was not intended to be about fundamental substantive values. 309
Values are not “out there” for courts to find. 310 Ely has inferred that the
closer the Court has come to overt substantive rights, the worse the
Court’s performance has been. 311 He has termed Lochner the “blasphemy of blasphemies.” 312 Furthermore, Ely has pointed out that although
part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose was to overturn Dred
Scott’s holding that blacks are not citizens, that does not tell us anything
about “the framers’ views on the decision’s invocation (as opposed to its
application) of the concept of substantive due process.” 313 In other
words, Dred Scott is not precedent for substantive due process advocates.
Ely has also been clear that he favors “a more rule-oriented approach” to courts’ application of Constitutional law. Rules carry advantages such as predictability, economy, and equality of treatment.
Rules are even worth, Ely concedes, the “occasional doubtful result.” 314
Ely has complained that courts ’do not often enough make “coherent and
applicable tests.” 315 Yet, Ely has denounced just about every significant

308. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 n.5 (1975) [hereinafter
“Flag Desecration”].
309. See supra note 289.
310. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 21.
311. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 57 n.66, “Indeed, a case can be made that
the closer the Court has come to overt fundamental-values reasoning the less impressively it has
performed.” (citing Scott v. Sanford, 60 How. 393 (1857); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
312. Ely, supra note 286, at 474 n.88 (1970).
313. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 16 n.19.
314. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 85:
“Unsurprisingly, I am with those who counsel a return of a more rule-oriented approach. Of course
the return should be a careful one: there is little point in formulating a rule unless and until the
courts’ experience and past analysis of the area in question can give them confidence that they will
get it about right. Where they are possible, though, rules seems as preferable here as they do in other areas of law. The advantages they bring—advantages of predictability, economy, and equality of
treatment as between one case and another—seem ‘worth the price of the occasional doubtful result.’” (citing Willis L. M. Reese, “Choice of Law: Rules or Approach,” 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315,
326-27 (1972). See also John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its
Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 212-13 (1981) (citing Reese, 57 CORNELL L. REV. at 322)).
An example of an occasional doubtful result: Ely has insinuated that O.J. Simpson was guilty but
went free because the reasonable doubt standard gave him an edge—O.J’s wealth gave him an advantage which is the exception, but O.J’s walking free is the price we must pay for giving ordinary—poor—defendants a “fighting chance.” ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at
230-31.
315. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 174. See also Flag Desecration, supra
note 307, at 1484.
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Constitutional law test the Court has handed down. He has called Balancing Tests “simply not the stuff on which assurance can confidently be
built.” 316 Dominant Purpose Tests are “simply vague and manipulative”
and “incoherent.” 317 Rationality Tests “should be abandoned.” 318
The defects Ely finds in the system run much deeper than the judicial branch and its substantive due process, favorite Constitutional Tests,
and general lack of rules. Ely’s writings display a much broader concern
with the governmental separation of powers structure, 319 and each
branch’s exercise of authority within it, or lack thereof. He has extensively and consistently criticized each branch of government—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—for straying far outside their Constitutionally sanctioned bounds.
According to Ely, Congress not only has no problem with hesitating
to “involve itself in controversies it retains the legal discretion to
avoid,” 320 but, as will be discussed shortly, it also avoids many of the
controversies it does not have the legal discretion to avoid. Congress is
basically worried about being reelected and keeping important constituents happy, not about big national issues having difficult to detect results. 321 Ely has noted that 97% of Congress are reelected, while state
judges get kicked out of office, “because both ‘branches’ have evolved
to the point where [Congress has] less to do with difficult and conspicuous political choices.” 322 There is a virtual consensus in recent decades
among political scientists and other observers, Ely has pointed out, that
Congress has essentially lost its policy-making ability. 323 (Nonetheless,
and confusingly, Ely has elsewhere written that “most of the important
316. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 185. See also Flag Desecration, supra
note 307, at 1506.
317. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607,
611 (1998).
318. John Hart Ely, Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107,110 n.10
(1990). See also, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 121 (“The usual demand of the
Equal Protection Clause is simply that the discrimination in question be rationally explainable).”
319. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 863 (1991) [hereinafter “Another Such Victory”]. “There’s enough of a trend . . . to suggest that we have a problem with
respect to the separation of powers.”
320. Id. at 867 n.104.
321. Id. at 856-57. “Congressmen know that the specific impact of broad national policies on
their districts is difficult to see, that effects are hidden, so to speak . . . . Thus, in order to attain
reelection, congressmen focus on things that are both more recognizable in their impact and more
credible indicators of the individual congressman’s power—federal projects and individual favors
for constituents. As the mix has shifted, the reelection rate has gone up enormously.”
322. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 488 n.99.
323. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 855.
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policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by people
accountable to them).” 324) Congress’ preferred policy-making method is
to follow the New Deal plan of establishing new executive bureaucracies
to deal with things. 325 The executive, in effect, ends up doing a bulk of
the legislating: much law is actually “made by the legions of unelected
administrators whose duty it becomes to give operative meaning to the
broad delegations the statutes contain.” 326 The bureaucracies then carry
responsibility and blame rather than legislatures.
Further, Congress disfavors Supreme Court nominees who, like
Bork, want Congress to make decisions. It’s easier on Congress if they
can place the blame on the Court. 327 “Thus, legislators can express sympathy with individual constituents of all persuasions without incurring
heavy costs at the next election.” 328 Congress has not exercised its ability
to limit the courts’ jurisdiction in over 100 years.329 In effect, the Senate’s “sole appropriate test of judicial performance,” Ely has informed
his readers, is “the political desirability of the outcomes reached.”330
Naturally, Congress’ checks on the Court have not proved to be of much
consequence. 331
Congress has also been dodging its important Constitutional responsibility of deciding on war and peace since 1950. 332 This time Congress has handed over its responsibilities to the executive, rather than the
judicial branch. (Incidentally, the courts have been avoiding the war and
peace issue, too. 333) Again, the Senate’s principle priorities in this area
have been “keeping (a) out of the line of fire, and (b) their jobs.” 334
In 1950, the Truman Administration “not only claimed unprecedented unilateral authority to commit our troops to combat” in Korea,
but it “even went so far as to suggest that Congress lacked authority to

324. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 4.
325. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 857-58.
326. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 131.
327. See Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 860-61.
328. Id. at 861.
329. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 19.
330. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 849 (discussing Reagan).
331. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 19.
332. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 145-46, 149. The power to declare war
is Constitutionally vested in Congress. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3
(Princeton Univ. Press 1993) [hereinafter WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY].
333. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 151. Ely elsewhere wrote that the
Court has “every business insisting that the officials the Constitution entrusts with [the war making]
decision be the ones who make it.” WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 54.
334. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 359-60.
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stop it!” 335 Congress, of course, in time was voting special appropriations and draft extensions, which amounted to consent. 336
In 1964, Congress passed the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, granting the Johnson Administration full authority “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United
States and prevent further aggression” in Vietnam. 337 Congress had
been misled by the executive about the state of affairs in the Tonkin Gulf
prior to and during the war, 338 however, even such apparent fraud does
not nullify Congress’ responsibility for what happened during the Vietnam War. It was Congress’ job to investigate the Tonkin Gulf situation prior to, or at least during the extended war. “That’s why we have
separate branches. That’s why the war power is vested in Congress.”339
Congress also ignored its responsibilities when it came to the “secret”
war in Laos. Enough Congressmen, Ely maintains, knew that something
was going on to have launched an investigation. 340
In 1971, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. “To a legislature unwilling either to stop the war or to take responsibility for it,
the prospect of getting that incriminating Tonkin Gulf Resolution off the
books must have seemed a godsend.” 341 Bombing in Cambodia continued until August 1973. 342 Ely claims that Nixon should have been impeached for waging war in Cambodia, not for tapping phones. Again,
Congress was not doing its job. 343
The 1973 War Powers Resolution, engineered to force Congress to
live up to its Constitutional duties, has failed. Presidents have evaded
their duties under it, and Congress and the courts have done nothing to
stop them. 344 President Bush did get approval for Desert Storm, but Ely
335. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 10 (citing Hearings on Assignment of
Ground Forces of the U.S. to Duty in the European Area before the Senate Comms. on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 88-93 (1951) (testimony of Secretary Acheson)).
336. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 11.
337. Id. at 15-16 (citing 78 Stat. 384 (1964)) (italics omitted).
338. Id. at 19.
339. Id. at 20.
340. Id. at 95, “Various members of Congress knew various things about various aspects of
it—surely enough to have triggered a further investigation if they’d been doing their job.”
341. John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality
of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 907 (1990).
342. Id. at 908.
343. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 104.
344. Id. at 48-49. The Resolution mandates that the President inform Congress within 48 hours
of introducing troops “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Within 60 days, extendable to 90 days, the President must
withdraw troops unless Congress declares war. Presidents have repeatedly either failed to file a
report, or have filed a “vague statement pointedly refusing to identify itself as a [Resolution] “hos-
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asserts that this is only because he knew in advance that he would get
approval, and because Bush would have invaded regardless. 345 More recently, President Clinton went into Bosnia without getting Congressional
approval first. 346 Ely terms the War Powers Resolution a “tale of Congressional spinelessness.” 347
Ely explains that a tacit agreement has been in effect between the
executive and legislative branches during post-World War II history.
This agreement covers not just foreign policy. The agreement is that the
President can make most of the decisions as long as Congress does not
have to be held accountable, and can even scold the President if something goes wrong. 348 Congress likes the situation of being able to “play
hide-and-complain.” 349 The President gets what he wants, and Congress
can spend its time with the (more important) business of reelection without worrying too much about responsibility.
More recently, Ely has attacked the Congress for its partisan behavior. Ely has noted that during the Clinton impeachment proceedings, the
Senate and the House both voted in “disturbingly partisan ways.” 350 Ely
commented, “I don’t know about you, but when Chief Justice Rehnquist
entered the Senate Chamber, I felt much as I did at the end of William
Golding’s Lord of the Flies: Thank God, everything’s going to be all
right. A grown up has arrived.” 351
However, Ely’s description of the Court’s behavior does not sound
like he considers it particularly “grown up.” Throughout history, Ely
has told us, the Court has been warned to “stick to its knitting or risk destruction”—but the Court continues to acquire power and nothing has
ever changed, even in the Warren years. 352 In 1978 Ely noted that since
the Warren years, the Court’s power had continually grown to the
strongest it had probably ever been. 353 Despite Hamilton’s vision in the

tilities” report (with the result that the sixty-day clock was not deemed to have been started).” Congress has essentially done nothing about this.
345. Id. at 50-51.
346. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 150.
347. War Powers Act, supra note 296, at 1419. In Ely’s revised draft (proposal) of the War
Powers Resolution, he requires courts to come into the process when the President or Congress are
not playing by the rules. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 125, 130-31, 135.
348. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 54.
349. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 150.
350. John Hart Ely, The Apparent Inevitability of Mixed Government, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
283, 288 n.28 (1999).
351. Id. at 289.
352. See Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21. See also DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,
supra note 289, at 47-48.
353. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21.
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Federalist 78 that the judiciary would have no influence over sword or
purse, formal checks on the Court have not been consequential. 354 In
short, the Court has been getting away with intervening in legislative
functions. 355 This is wrong because, as Ely has asserted, legislatures are
clearly better situated to reflect popular consensus 356 and courts are not
constructed to measure popular morality. 357 (Does this reflect a Court
that can prevail because it is “grown up”?)
Perhaps it makes sense why judges today are chosen primarily for
how they will vote on particular issues. 358 This is dangerous because
judges, like legislators, are human and “it is sometimes difficult for them
to avoid unconsciously importing their personal loyalties and political
convictions into their work.” 359 Ely notes that, however, such transgressions in the judiciary are “rare.” 360 Perhaps.
On the other hand, he has elsewhere noted that “[it] takes an unusually strong or apolitical judge to avoid being discernibly affected by her
assessment of the politically desirable outcome.” 361 Ely has used Justice
Souter’s appointment as evidence that judicial appointments in recent
decades are not about the legal process but about politics, and further
notes things are unlikely to change. Souter, unlike Bork, portrayed himself as a moderate. 362 Hence, he received Congressional approval. Ely
is unwilling to accept completely Souter’s claims of moderacy, however.
Ely has inferred that Souter must have had an opinion on Roe, despite
Souter’s claims to the contrary. 363 Ely apparently does not believe Supreme Court justices can be truly impartial.
Ely certainly has offered plenty of examples which demonstrate
such impartiality. After the “blasphemy of blasphemies” Lochner, 364
and its some 200-case progeny, came Roe. As Justice Stewart’s concurrence in that case concedes, and Ely agrees with, Roe is the product of
Lochner—in other words, substantive due process. 365 Roe’s most
354. Id. at 19.
355. Id. at 22.
356. Id. at 49.
357. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 23.
358. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 843.
359. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 161.
360. Id.
361. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 835-36 n.8.
362. Id. at 850-52.
363. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 492 n. 129.
364. Ely, supra note 286, at 474 n.88.
365. See, e.g., ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 291. “The Court continues to
disavow the philosophy of Lochner. Yet as Justice Stewart’s concurrence admits, it is impossible
candidly to regard Roe as the product of anything else.” Ely claims to be a long time supporter of
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“frightening” aspect is that its “super-protected right” (privacy right to
abort) is not inferable from the Constitution’s language, the Framers’
thinking on the subject, any derivable Constitutional general values, or
the nation’s governmental structure. 366 The Roe Court, according to
some members of the profession was “indulging in sheer acts of will,
ramming its personal preferences down the country’s throat.” 367 Roe is
not Constitutional law, nor does it make much of an effort to be. 368 Roe
“amended” the Constitution, and the wrong tribunal did the amending. 369
There are many other examples, outside the substantive due process
field. For example, in 1971, writing on the Court’s decision in Harris v.
New York, 370 Ely commented that though reasonable persons can disagree on the proper role of the Court, no one could disagree on the undesirability of the Court’s “at best, gross negligence concerning the state of
the record and the controlling precedents.” 371 That opinion was “little
more than a vote—a reflection of numerical power.” 372 Ely tossed this
“vote” up to the fact that Nixon’s judicial appointees wanted to reverse
many of the holdings of the Warren Court. 373 Leaving aside the number
of 5-4 opinions we have seen, Ely attempts to reassure his readers that
“decisions that fail to persuade often do not long outlast the men who
wrote them.” 374 Does that mean Roe will be overturned? After all, the
’Roe opinion was “simply not adequate.” 375 No, Ely has told us that Roe
is probably a steadfast decision. 376 He has also told us that 5-4 decisions
are (at least at times) the creatures of Presidential appointments and
“chaos.” 377

abortion. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade“”, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 924 n.40 (1973) [hereinafter “Wages”].
366. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 289.
367. Id. at 294.
368. Wages, supra note 365, at 947.
369. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 299.
370. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statements elicited in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be used to impeach).
371. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 212. See also, Alan M. Dershowitz &
John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority “”80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1199-00 (1971) [hereinafter “Harris”].
372. Harris, supra note 371, at 1226.
373. Id. at 1227.
374. Id. at 1226. (Ely cannot be attacked for his failure to use a gender neutral term since political correctness had not come into vogue.)
375. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 283.
376. Id. at 296, “Roe v. Wade seems like a durable decision.”
377. Id. at 275, “Pena [an affirmative action case] was a 5-4 decision, however—the two Clinton appointees numbering among the four dissenters—so presumably the chaos will continue [in the
affirmative action field]”) . . . .
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Then there was Erie. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 378 is the famous
1938 case which outlines the rule of when to use state or federal law in a
diversity case; Erie is—in Ely’s words—the “very essence” of federalism. 379 Despite Erie’s fame—it is a mandatory citation for cases raising
an issue with federal or state jurisdiction in diversity cases Ely claims
that Erie “provides little guidance on such issues.” 380 Ely explains that
Erie was redefined by the Warren Court in Hanna v. Plumer in 1965. 381
However, Hanna “does not seem even remotely to capture Erie’s true
meaning.” 382 Nonetheless Erie—providing little guidance in the first
place—has apparently survived the alteration Hanna did to it. Why did
Erie survive 1965 and retain its popularity? Ely is willing to place that
accomplishment largely with the prestige of a single judge, Justice Harlan, who concurred separately in Hanna. How could the Warren Court
alter a cornerstone federalism case (even if that case did not, allegedly,
address the issue well), and how could a single justice in concurrence be
responsible for that case surviving the Court’s alterations? Well, the Supreme Court, Ely commented on this question, “is the Supreme
Court.” 383 Of course, Ely has noted that judges are free to change their
minds, especially when they reach the Supreme Court,384 but are Supreme Court justices equally as entitled to overturn early Court rulings
whenever they please? It seems so. Ely admits he has no “welldeveloped” theory of when stare decisis should be invoked, and he does
not think anyone else does, either. 385 “”
Then of course, there was Brown, which overruled Plessy. As one
who advocates for more rules, less judicial legislation, and generally
stricter separation of powers, Ely’s support of Brown is at first blush
confusing. Ely has not unequivocally supported the Warren Court. 386
He has denounced all the per curium orders that came down soon after
Brown on desegregating buses, golf courses, beaches, etc., as having little if anything to do with how segregated schooling harms black chil-

378. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
379. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie“”, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974) [hereinafter “Erie”].
380. Id. at 707-08.
381. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
382. Erie, supra note 379, at 696-97. Ely indicates that while Erie reaffirms federalism, Hanna
“[saps] the strength from that system.” Id. at 697 n.33.
383. Id. at 697 (presumably he means that they have that power).
384. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 223.
385. Id. at 305.
386. Though Ely did dedicate his seminal book DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289,
to Earl Warren.
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dren. 387 Ely has called Justice Warren himself “sexist” because Warren
did not want a female law clerk. 388 Ely’s critical attitude when it comes
to the Warren Court’s post-Brown lack of legal process and Chief Justice
Warren’s sexist attitude toward clerks is understandable. Ely’s praise of
Brown is not quite so.
Ely admits that the Warren Court at times superimposed its value
judgments but only “when liberty genuinely hung in the balance.” 389
Recall that judges should not impose substantive value judgments, and
are not better reflectors of “conventional values.” 390 Recall what Ely has
told about the evils of judicial legislation and judges being appointed for
political purposes. Yet, he has nonetheless maintained that appointed
judges are “comparative outsiders” “largely removed from the political
hurly-burly.” 391 Judges have no “special pipeline” to the peoples’ values, and in fact their nonpolitical office keeps them from having such a
pipeline. Hence, objectivity. 392 More or less. Judges still are somewhat
concerned, after all, with the next election, 393 and are more like politicians than they historically had been. 394 This is confusing.
The reasoning, of course, is that Brown is a Carolene Products note
4 type case: when “there is a special reason to distrust the democratic
process in a given case” 395 —when discrete and insular minorities are at
issue—then the Court may override legislation. The Warren Court did
not seek to impose fundamental values; 396 the Warren Court was simply
protecting minorities from a majority rule which discriminated against
and harmed the minorities—that’s the Carolene Products spirit: “the
value judgments of the majority [cannot be] the vehicle for protecting
minorities from the value judgments of the majority.” 397 So, there is no
problem with the Warren Court superimposing its value judgments in
Brown. In fact, the Warren Court’s approach outlines the proper “interpretivist” approach to dealing with open-ended Constitutional provisions. 398
387. Loving, supra note 307, at 218.
388. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 334-35 (discussing when Ely was a
clerk for Warren in 1964).
389. Id. at 4.
390. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 102.
391. Ely, supra note 286, at 487.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 487 n.124
394. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 355.
395. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 156 n.69.
396. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21 n.77.
397. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
398. Ely, supra note 286, at 451, “An ‘interpretivist’ approach that would confine the Constitu-
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That leaves us with the question, still, of why Brown is a proper
Carolene Products type case. The Brown Court itself did not mention
Carolene Products or its discrete and insular minorities. Carolene
Products’ discrete and insular minorities were actually not mentioned
(after the original case) until 1971. 399 The Brown Court based its Equal
Protection argument solely upon the assumption that segregation in public education does in fact harm black children because “a feeling of inferiority” is generated “as to their status in the community.” 400 Plessy was
quickly dismissed and rejected by looking to the authority of several
contemporary social psychology studies. 401
The Brown Court probably did not cite to Carolene Products because Brown’s reasoning was not taken immediately from that case.
Carolene Products’ note on strict scrutiny for legislation affecting discrete and insular minorities simply laid the groundwork for what
emerged as the “suspect class” analysis. 402 Strict scrutiny means that
legislation which involves a suspect classification (such as racial minorities, women, or aliens) will be invalidated unless the state can show a
compelling state interest. 403 Suspect classification analysis was first explicitly used in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States. 404 As one commentator put it, Carolene Products’ analysis did not “culminat[e]” until
Brown. 405
Ely has written that segregated schools were supported by racism,
which was a “dominant strain” in American life then, and [today]. 406 On
the other hand, he has also written that to be unconstitutional, racial discrimination must be intentional, 407 because the same governmental conduct can be both constitutional and unconstitutional depending on the
tion’s meaning to the directives actually contained within its four corners proves on analysis incapable of keeping faith with the document’s promise . . . . When we search for an external source of
values with which to fill in the Constitution’s open texture . . . we search in vain . . . . A quite different approach is available, and to discern its outlines we need look no further than to the Warren
Court.”
399. By Justice Blackmun in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See also
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 148, 151.
400. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
401. Id. See also id. at n.11.
402. Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
107, 122 (1990).
403. See, e.g., id. at 132.
404. Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (holding that the
relocation of Japanese residents on the West Coast constitutional).
405. Simon, supra note 402, at 125. This author also has read, cites heavily to, and perhaps
has been influenced by Ely, however.
406. See, e.g., Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 47.
407. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 140.
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intent. 408 However, Ely has also stated that forcing legislatures to articulate purposes (intent) for their legislation is not workable, since there are
too many overlapping purposes when legislators vote on bills. 409 Legislative motivation should only be examined by courts when the “improper
discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitutionally gratuitous” 410 is at stake. The most important way to ordinarily read statutory
provisions is on the plain language, in light of foreseeable effects, and “a
healthy dose of common sense.” 411 Aren’t the appropriate questions
then, under Ely’s reasoning, whether segregation by race is intentional
discrimination, and whether its legislative motivation may be examined
by the court because “constitutionally gratuitous goods” are being “distributed” with “improper discrimination”? What “constitutionally gratuitous goods” are being “distributed”? Public education?
Assuming public education is a “constitutionally gratuitous good,”
is segregation of schools by race discrimination, and if so, is it “improper” and “intentional”? Ely has asserted that Brown is correct without offering any evidence or explanation why. Apparently he relies on the
same social psychology studies that the Brown Court did. 412 Yet, while
on the one hand supporting the Court’s reliance on the social psychology
studies, 413 Ely has also maintained that that the social psychology studies
which the Court relied on “when not simply irrelevant to the Court’s
point” are, at least, widely professionally criticized.414
Furthermore, Ely has stressed that “entrusted with the care of the
nation’s principles,” the Court “should hesitate to issue a pronouncement
which can be read to mean that Negroes are different from white persons. . . .” 415 Ely does not mention that the Brown Court’s insistence
that segregated schooling harms black children was in effect averring
that black children are different from white children. After all, there was
no discussion by the Court that white children were harmed by segregation. Ely does not make such a distinction, either. 416 Ely has actually
408. Id. at 137.
409. Id. at 129 (agreement on purpose would be hard to come by).
410. John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis. 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1155, 1160-61 (1978): “It . . . cannot be emphasized too strongly that analysis of motivation is appropriate only to claims of improper discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitutionally gratuitous.” “Constitutionally gratuitous” refers to benefits which people are not entitled to
as a matter of substantive constitutional law. Id. at 1160-61.
411. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 130.
412. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
413. See Loving, supra note 307, at 216 n.7.
414. See id. at 216-17. See also id. at 217 n.9.
415. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 252.
416. Ely has elsewhere inferred that minorities are different from white majorities. In his dis-
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commented that the Brown Court “would have been better off not citing
sources for the proposition that segregation harms black children,” but
rather should have retorted: “A white legislature tells you that because of
your color you’re not fit to go to school with their children and you’re
not hurt? Get serious.” 417 So the Court’s reasoning was wrong, but the
ends justify the means?
In any event, Ely seems to simply accept the Brown Court’s reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment, when he states that only “race-like”
classifications should be considered “suspect.” 418 Yet, how Ely’s support of Brown squares with his assertion that suspect classes must be
systematically barred access to the political system 419 is confusing. How
do segregated schools bar black children, even implicitly or consequentially, from the political process? After all, it must be remembered, the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment are about equal access to
the political process and discriminatory practices, not substantive rights
(like the right to desegregated schooling). Courts never said that schools
have to be racially balanced. 420
Perhaps Ely and the Brown Court’s implicit reliance upon Carolene
Products, and their assumption that segregation causes black children
harm may be attributed to the fault found in Carolene Products by Justice Rehnquist: “It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road.” 421
In other words, lacking concrete evidence that segregation causes black
children (alone) harm, perhaps Ely, as the Brown Court, simply decided
to “find” what amounts to a discrete and insular minority, and thereafter
“legitimately” impose morality upon the school systems because with
“suspect” classes such morality imposition is acceptable. It seems that,
though Ely denies it, he is affirming that courts are in the best position to

cussion of the effects of creating black Democratic majority-minority voting blocks, Ely comments
that even though creation of such blocks “bleaches” the surrounding areas, creating a higher percentage of overall Republican districts, the Democrats don’t try to block the creation of majorityminority districts. This is partly because the minority constituents lobby for such voting blocks despite the fact that the Republican districts are thereby increased. Ely appears to be inferring here
that the minority constituents aren’t intelligent enough to figure out that the voting blocks do not
work due to “bleaching”. Ely, supra note 317, at 618-19.
417. Loving, supra note 307, at 222 n.21 (noting that other commentators have agreed and citing Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960)).
418. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 149.
419. Id. at 166 (discussing women).
420. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 255.
421. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 723, 729 (1974).
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make moral judgments. 422
But shouldn’t we be wary of Ely’s warning that when courts start
imposing values, it is systematically in the interests of the upper-middle
professional class? 423 As Ely commented of the Court’s 1977 freedom
of expression opinions, the opinions flowed not from a Carolene Products perspective, but from “a jurisprudence that defines the Court’s role
as one of protecting those values the Court regards as truly fundamental.” 424 Judges and commentators alike often think they are speaking in
terms of some objective standard, but they are in fact “discovering” their
own upper-middle class values. 425 Lower-class needs such as food, jobs,
or shelter are never deemed “fundamental.” 426 So why school desegregation?
Well, perhaps, in Ely’s own words: “The large liberal center of legal academia [is] characteristically fearful of getting out of step with the
latest trend. . . .” 427 Certainly by 1954 or 1994, the trend was moving
away from apartheid. However, interpretivism is not a passing fad.
Courts always try to talk in interpretivist terms. 428
However, the Court sometimes takes it upon itself to change fundamental aspects of Constitutional law. Well, all right, even Ely has
changed his mind about a fundamental right. 429 Sometimes the Court
amends the Constitution when it should not.” 430 Sometimes even single
judges can carry terrific amounts of weight. Overall, Ely’s views on the
present state of the governmental structure cast a dim light; each branch
has long been in serious constitutional breach. Even most legal writing

422. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 57 (Ely denying that courts should make
moral judgments).
423. Id. at 59:
Thus the list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to enshrine as fundamental is a list with which readers of this book will have little trouble identifying: expression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the home, personal
autonomy, even the right not to be locked into a stereotypically female sex role and supported by one’s husband.
424. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 14-15.
425. Id. at 16.
426. See id. at 37-38.
427. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 838.
428. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 3.
429. In his earlier career, Ely decried the privacy right, but later changed his mind and stated
that it’s “entirely proper to infer a general privacy right, so long as care is taken in defining the sort
of right the inference will support.” ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 286. “I later
changed my mind about the propriety of inferring a general constitutional right of ‘privacy,’ though
I continued to have qualms about whether it would apply in cases like Griswold and Roe.” Id. at
455 n.3.
430. Id. at 299 (discussing Roe v. Wade).
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today, Ely tells us, boils down to nothing but political preferences.
Hence, the recent lack in consensus on what constitutes good scholarship. 431 It all comes down to politics. 432
2. And What He Says Now
Ely once wrote, “If you’re going to be a judge, the United States
Supreme Court has its advantages.” 433 Apparently. Ely commenced his
Panel speech by reminding the audience that he, as all the other Panelists, inevitably let their own theories “seep in.” 434 Okay, he’s not straying too far from what he has written about judges needing to be unusually strong in order to avoid being affected by a desirable political
outcome. 435 Ely also commented that unlike the Brown Court, this Panel
is not unanimous. Considering the members of the Panel, he says this is
only natural. He then attributed the Warren Court’s Brown decision’s
unanimity to Justice Warren himself. Okay, so sometimes single justices
hold terrific amounts of power. We have heard that before.
Ely proceeds to address the famous social psychology footnote. He
calls the critics’ claim that courts should not engage in psychology “preposterous,” 436 because if one wants to know about social psychology,
one should obviously ask social psychologists. The trouble is that Ely
admits that the social psychology studies which the Brown Court cited
had been almost universally criticized in the social psychology literature.
So Courts should rely on social psychology studies even if they are
poorly conducted and have faulty results?
This dilemma Ely quickly cleans up by sweepingly accepting the
social psychology studies because it is “self-evidently absurd” that black
children can choose to be hurt by segregated schooling, as the Plessy
Court had attested. Clearly, Ely says, insecurity and inferiority feelings
are generated by segregation, because if a white legislature tells the
black children that they are not fit to go to school with their white children, the black children will be hurt. Plessy is overruled. Period.
Hold on. The social psychology studies are deficient, so where is
Ely getting the conclusion that black children are harmed by segregated
431. Id. at 475 n.15.
432. However, Ely has attacked realists, particularly the extreme realists who believe Courts
should act as politicians and impose their own values. See, e.g., Fundamental Values, supra note
293, at 17.
433. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 414 n.176.
434. See Ely, supra note 26.
435. See, e.g., Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 835-36 n.8.
436. See Ely, supra note 26.
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schools? Are the black children actually hearing from a white legislature that they are unfit to go to school with the legislature’s children?
Since when do legislatures communicate with school children? It
sounds as if Ely is doing little more than making the “unthinkable” argument—an argument which he later in his speech accuses Michaelman
of leaning towards. The “unthinkable” argument, Ely asserts, is “dangerous,” especially with Supreme Court Judges. Yet isn’t this what Ely
is saying: It is unthinkable that black children cannot be harmed, so it’s
unconstitutional.
Ely attacks the Warren Court for making the “unthinkable” argument, when it said that it is unthinkable that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause should not apply to the federal District
of Colombia. The Warren Court was therefore suggesting that there was
no rational construction for the Equal Protection Clause not applying to
the federal government. Ely says the Warren Court was wrong—there is
a rational reason. The reconstruction Congress trusted itself more than it
did the state legislatures. Perfectly psychologically plausible.
Ely then quickly dismisses the idea that due process could contain
such a substantive demand as being contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment, since an amendment ratified in 1791 (the Fifth) cannot
contain one ratified in 1868 (the Fourteenth). To do so would to be turning somersaults with time. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to
apply to the states, but in a context which already had been acknowledged “in various contexts” as being applicable to the federal government. Ely claims he has annotations for this blanket assertion, but does
not bother to share them. So, the Bolling problem is solved. But his listeners really don’t know how. He refers his listeners to his book Democracy and Distrust.
As far as the remedy is concerned, Ely would require immediate
compliance, but the Constitution, he tells us, requires no more than desegregation. Therefore, busing and demographic equality within the
schools is not constitutionally required. Busing, in fact, did more harm
than good, at least in Boston, where Ely attended law school during the
busing period. Ely reminisces about Harvard dinner parties he attended
where people were “tut-tutting” about how racist the Irish were. The
Irish’s reaction was only normal though, Ely tells us, because they were
the ones feeling “under siege” by the busing. The elite of Harvard and
Boston had their children tucked away in private or suburban schools. Is
he inferring that, in addition to the Irish, the elite circle Ely frequently
dined amongst, were indeed racist but did not have need to show it? So
overall, the Warren Court relied on poorly conducted studies, inaccurate-
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ly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause’s application to the federal
government, used the dangerous “unthinkability” standard, and apparently did not do so well with their remedy. Yet, the Warren Court’s
holding, at least, is to be upheld. However, Ely gives us little, if any,
explanation why.
It is ironic that Ely should play a Supreme Court Justice, and attack
the Warren Court’s opinion as viciously as he did. He once wrote that
even if law professors could agree on what is “good . . . there is no reason to assume their judgment is any better on that issue than the
Court’s.” 437 It seems Ely, as well as every other panelist, has just such
an assumption in mind.
It is also ironic that Ely has, in his writings, shared some of his personal and religious background with his readers in the past. He has told
his readers that he descended from three centuries of Presbyterian ministers on both sides of his family, 438 and he has also told that his thinking
has remained “essentially consistent” from his student days to the present. He has commented that this continuity in thought is “frightening”
to him, but he does not consider it a defect. 439 He has further commented that his family religious history does not really give him authority to
speak ex cathedra. 440 Yet, he has on more than one occasion quoted a
particular Bible passage in his writings: “Indeed, those not so hopelessly
mired in legal positivism as I am often accused of being would do well
to consult their Bibles, in particular Leviticus 24:22: ‘Ye shall have one
manner of Law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country:
for I am the LORD your God.’” 441 The irony is that Ely often does in
his panel speech speak ex cathedra. He does not quote the Bible.
Yet the legal positivism he is “accused” of, and the legal process he
has held himself out as an adherent to is utterly absent from his Panel
discussion. Plessy is sweepingly overruled. The primary authority for
his Brown and Bolling rulings are an obscure certainty that blacks are
harmed, and another obscure conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause
was already acknowledged to apply to the federal government—despite
the fact that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal
government. Citations, explanation, and evidence are deemed unnecessary, apparently. Sounds rather ex cathedra.
437.
438.
439.
not).
440.
441.

ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 294.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 188 (perhaps confining this continuity of thought to religious clauses, but perhaps
Id. at 197.
Id. at 390 n.199.
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Another irony is a story he once told his readers about a speech he
gave in Germany. Shortly before having to go on stage, he decided with
a colleague what to speak on by flipping a coin. The coin toss easily
could have resulted in Ely having to speak on something he did not believe in. This did not seem to bother Ely in the least. 442 Would Ely do
the same thing at this Panel discussion? That is, would he simply uphold Brown despite all he has written on legal process and the proper
role of courts because that is the politically correct thing to do? Is this
why he neglected to give his audience any concrete explanations for his
conclusions?
Apparently, his panel opinion is so obviously accurate that details
can easily be omitted. (He did not run out of time, he actually complained, perhaps jokingly, that he had a whole five minutes left to
speak). Perhaps law professors do actually have better judgment than
courts—even the great Warren Court? Perhaps Ely does have the right
to speak ex cathedra? Perhaps Ely flipped a coin before the Panel? Perhaps being on the Supreme Court does have its advantages—isn’t the
Court, after all, where the grown ups are?
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Speculation on Panel Conflicts
We have tried to speculate a little bit on how the conflict between
the Panelists’ previous positions and their Panel opinions could occur.
One explanation is that the Panelists meant to give us an object lesson in
how the game is played. If one is playing checkers—or, perhaps, sitting
as a Fourth Century Mediterranean bishop on a monumental theological
council—this is how that game is played. Maybe our secular Panel
Bishops wanted to say: We do not necessarily think checkers is a good
game, but if we must play we want to distinguish ourselves and win.
Similarly, the Bishops at Nicaea may have thought: We do not necessarily like the term homoousios and what it does to the sacred text, but accepting it is better than political upheaval and anathematism. There is a
received tradition of methodological orthodoxy, and a canon, albeit expandable, and here is the best justification that can be given in that mode
under the circumstances at hand.
Another possibility is that “none of these Ivy League scholars was
going to commit academic and political death by overturning Brown be442. Id. at 31-32.
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cause it conflicted with their jurisprudential beliefs.” 443 This introduces
a hard note of reality. The jurisprudence student writing this opinion
went on to indicate that certain economic incentives were involved, such
as book contracts, more prestigious appearances, and the like. 444 We do
not believe that these distinguished panelists could be influenced by
book contracts or other such factors. However, for some ineffable reason, what the student says is true. It could destroy her credibility if an
academic were to pronounce Brown morally incorrect. 445
Also, it may be opined that few of the participants may have
thought seriously about how their opinions could have impetus beyond
the week’s event. 446 This is a plausible explanation, and supports the
general idea that the Panelists’ powers of self-reflection were suspended.
The idea of the Brown Panel seemed to be a good one. Knowledge
could be disseminated, ideas exchanged, a book written, professional obligations and duties accomplished—where is the problem? The problem
is that of intense internal contradiction, and affirming the insight that the
Panelists left the impression (perhaps unintended) that legal realism is
correct: law is or often can be manipulated and result-oriented. In other
words, the text may essentially be subjected to different interpretations
responsive to forces outside the text. 447
Another jurisprudence student was not surprised at all that the Panelists used the standard positivist mold to affirm Brown, in spite of holding jurisprudential theories that positivism was not an appropriate label
for the processes actually followed in the legal process. 448 Presumably,
this student has come to expect that jurisprudence will be selected to
achieve the political result desired. The student found the Jurisprudence
labels—realism, positivism, and so on—academic prattle, which does
not conform to what it takes to cope in real world situations. 449 She also
argued that no one—academics or other legalists—really function out of
443. Brian Stabley, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on file
with the Authors). An earlier draft of our article was presented to Professor Van Doren’s jurisprudence seminar class for written comments. We thank the class for their reflections.
444. Id.
445. See Canon, supra note 89, at 998 (“one establishes oneself as a properly acculturated lawyer by affirming Brown’s correctness.”).
446. Jackson Maynard, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on
file with the Authors).
447. However, the fact that this Panel intended to produce a book would mitigate against the
idea that the Panel offerings were “disposable.”
448. Descera Daigle, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on file
with the Authors).
449. Interview with Descera Diagle, student, Florida State C. of L., in Tallahassee, FL (Mar.
2001).
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boxes such as positivism or realism exclusively. Thus, the Panelists
were displaying a pragmatism that legalists generally employ.
Another jurisprudence student opined much as some of the Florida
State Law Professors did: What did you expect the Panelists to do? 450
The litigants are entitled to a reasoned opinion according to what she
called “the rules of the game.” This student criticized us for labeling anyone who even refers to the Constitution as a formalist, and asked where
our (the authors’) opinion is. Legal realism may be fine, but how do you
write a realist opinion? The card carrying realists, like Jerome Frank (we
might add), adopted the positivist mode when he became a judge, despite his resounding attack on it. Basically the student critic argued that
none of the panel opinions conflicted with their previous writings, because none really rejected the rule of law in their previous writings. 451
Whether or not the Panelists rejected the rule of law, they did cast
serious doubt on it. The Panelists we review find the system malleable
in varying degrees. In other words, they are often “legal realists” when
they write. Moreover, there is an analogy to Pascal’s Wager. Pascal
said that maybe there is a God, and maybe not. But on the chance there
might be a God, I will behave as though there is.452 We doubt that most
contemporary religions are very happy with this wager because it delegitimates the enterprise. Similarly, if the distinguished Panelists want to
say, “Even though we doubt it, we choose the formalist mode because it
is taken as the effective mode for determining legal controversy,” that
will sufficiently delegitimate the “law god” to make our effort worthwhile. So as our “stupidest housemaid” suggests in the Introduction:
“So much for the rule of law. And that scare me too.” 453
B. Closing Argument
In summary, we have argued that the AALS Constitutional Panel
on Brown had similarities to the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE. Both societies were handling a crisis, a perceived need for religious orthodoxy:
the labeling of religious heresy in Nicaea, and secular policies out of

450. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
451. See Eugenia Khankhasayev, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001)
(paper on file with the Authors).
452. On Pascal’s Wager, See generally 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 325 (1993)
(existence of God cannot be proven, but one is better off believing because if right, there is eternal
life, and if wrong, little is lost).
453. See supra note 2; cf. Ronald Dworkin, New York Review of Books, Feb. 22, 2001, at 910 (suggesting that the Supreme Court in the Bush/Gore election rendered a decision responsive to
their political agenda, dressed in unprincipled legal garb) (book review).
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synch with international and national political needs and ideals in
Brown. Both were settled with cognizance of a political spectrum, more
by policy or political force field than by the dictates of doctrine. 454 In
both cases, there was a reinforcement of a methodological orthodoxy,
Scriptures and the Constitution, as the source of truth by agreement, for
a time at least.
The AALS Panel was unanimous in affirming the result in Brown,
which is remarkable in itself because of the immense controversy when
Brown was decided. However, we have recounted two fault lines in the
Panel opinions. First, the dissonance flowing from the conflicts in composition of sources or canon relied upon, and the even greater dissonance
from the variety of justifications drawn from the canon. Second, most of
the Panelists used formalism, in contrast with the conflicting jurisprudence of their prepanel writings, at least the ones we selected at random.
Some prepanel writings disdained the use of the Courts at all to further
causes important to the Panel members, such as improved race relations. 455 Most of the Panelists we studied in detail decried formalism
and the operations of the legal structure at large in their prepanel writings, but were willing to use it when it suited their purposes.
How could this happen? While it could be an exercise in conscious
deception, 456 we doubt this possibility. Whatever the motives of the
Panelists, one of the most interesting things is that their enterprise is an
inadvertent example of postmodernism: their unfolding revelation of anti-foundationalism and anti-formalism in their writings, while upholding
formalism at least for limited purposes in their affirmation of Brown.
There is, in any event, irony where an exercise designed to vindicate reason and formalism ends up showing extreme manipulation, virtual meaninglessness of the canon, and at worst inadvertent hypocrisy caused by
the tension between the panel opinions and the previous writings. 457
We suggest that politics and current conceptions of morality controlled both the Council of Nicaea and the Brown Panel. Constantine
454. See Michael Klarman, Mason Ladd, Lecture at Florida State Univ. College of Law,
“Brown v. Board of Education: Law or Politics?” (Jan. 26, 2001) (lecturer argues that the two most
conservative members of the Brown Court were influenced to go along due to politics of winning
the Cold War).
455. See Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 71 (1985) (courts
were of little help in the parable told by Bell in attacking racist law).
456. See Rob Atkinson, Nihilism Need Not Apply: Law and Literature in Barth’s The Floating
Opera, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 747, 815-16 (2000) (suggesting that a novelist may have consciously attempted deception).
457. Canon, supra note 89, at 1020 (would we really be happy discussing how to make slave
law the best it can be?). Could it be that instead Professor Balkin had his tongue in his cheek and
set a trap for his victims?
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wanted to consolidate and pacify his potentially unruly empire. The
United States wanted to expand its empire to the hearts and minds of the
Third World. 458 Texts with symbolic value to the citizens involved were
drawn into service by the legal priesthood to resolve needs outside the
texts.
Incidentally, hopefully some appropriate moral natural law, if any
there were, was vindicated in Brown. Indeed, perhaps there is a further
parallel between the Brown Panel and the Council of Nicaea: religious or
“natural law.” Perhaps the Panelists’ unanimity in result and reliance on
methodological orthodoxy, if not in precise method (which canon to
use), is supportive of a natural law moral result. As the Bishops at Nicaea (and perhaps even Constantine himself 459) convened, deliberated,
and ultimately resolved their controversy under the belief that God’s
singular will would ultimately be manifested, 460 the Brown Panel seems
to be inadvertently suggesting a similar belief in an invincible moral dictate. It is as if the Panelists were saying to us collectively: Brown is affirmed because there is only one moral choice no matter how the canon
is read. The inadvertence of this “religious” undertone underlines its
very presence. On the other hand, the manipulation of the canon by the
Panel, and the Panel’s ability to draw contradictory inferences from the
same canon appears to seriously undermine a natural law approach. If
natural law means an objective referent outside traditional legal materi458. See Bell supra note 40.
459. Though scholars are not in agreement on Constantine’s religious convictions, see
COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 29, some suggest that Constantine’s personal religion was not add odds
with Christianity, and hence Nicaea was not solely a political matter. See CHADWICK, supra note
54, at 125-32. “[C]onstantine was not aware of any mutual exclusiveness between Christianity and
his faith in the Unconquered Sun. The transition from solar monotheism . . . to Christianity was not
difficult.” Id. at 126. Before a battle, Constantine said that he once saw a cross across the midday
sun inscribed with “By this conquer.” Id. In other words, the line between paganism and Christianity was not so distinct, and Constantine may not have only been playing politics with the Bishops;
perhaps he did feel he had a religious duty to unify the empire as the secular “sun.” Still, Constantine knew that the military victories that he needed to consolidate his empire were thought by
Christians to be the will of the Christian God. See id. at 125 (his decisive victory in battle thought
to be the will of the Christian God).
460. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 57 ([w]hatever is decided in the holy councils of the
bishops must be attributed to the divine will.). The fact that the Nicene Creed was later repudiated
is irrelevant to the analogy to natural law because God’s will can change. (Co-author Van Doren
does not agree that natural law is a term properly invoked when the moral tenets used change diametrically over time. Co-author MacGrady thinks that natural law can be invoked even when moral
tenets change over time because depending upon which religious or spiritual viewpoint one is coming from, natural law can be understood in different in ways. For example, to a Christian, natural
law may mean the dictate of a Christian “Other” God (Other than the human self), while to a Buddhist there is no “other” to give such dictates; to a Buddhist time is not linear and what is morally
right can well change over “time.”)
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als to provide objective guidance, it is difficult to see it in this panel exercise. 461
Or finally, not implausibly, maybe the Panelists meant to play with
us (deceive us?) and are laughing at us! On the other hand, as one of the
Jurisprudence students remarked, at the end of the day, “are we [not]
laughing at them. . . . ?” 462

461. Unless one is willing to accept a definition of natural law which would include an “objective” referent manifested in different forms. In other words, the Panelists agreed on the result, but
now how to get there.
462. Jimmy Midyette, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on
file with the Authors).
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